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Abstract 
In this research I present a conceptual analysis of conceptions of child and childhood. These 
conceptions largely point to a worldview that sees childhood as a universal construct, and I argue that 
the conceptualisation of childhood differs in cultural, historical, political, philosophical and 
developmental psychology domains.  I argue that what is common to many of these discourses is that 
concepts and conceptions of child and childhood reveal differences in how one views the dichotomy 
between adult-child.  I also go on to discuss the implications of these conceptions of child, childhood 
and child’s voice in a school context.  The many discourses of childhood are underpinned by beliefs and 
assumptions about the experience and purpose of childhood, and therefore inform policies and shape 
educational practice. How a community or society conceptualises childhood is implied in the practices 
and policies of that community or society. While some researchers agree there is a need to 
reconceptualise childhood, consensus dissolves around the diverse definitions of child and childhood 
and how child’s voice should be included in educational contexts.                                                                       
I explore the positioning of child in historical and contemporary constructs and discuss emerging trends 
of how child and childhood is conceptualised. I examine arguments with regards to opening up debates 
that suggest that if child and childhood is reconceptualised there is potential to move beyond 
normative policies, practices and pedagogies that remain entrenched in our current educational 
contexts.  Drawing on my own experiences in working with children I use these experiences to argue 
that there has been a shift in my own thinking about child and offer through the literature that many 
authors suggest alternative constructions of child as a being, with capabilities of giving voice. 
To consider what the concept voice means in terms of including child’s voice in educational contexts, 
links emerge with the discourse of children’s rights and the diverse and complex conceptualisations of 
child and childhood.  Researchers, educators and policy-policy makers need to examine their meanings 
of child and childhood and critically engage with the assumptions thereof in order to reconceptualise 
hegemonic dominance of policies and practices based on one definition of child.  Children’s rights have 
been part of a legal framework, while understanding of what it means to be child run deeper into 
theories of childhood underpinned by moral, socio- economic and political agendas that are part of 
child’s world.   Advocates of the children’s rights discourse argue that a contemporary crisis in 
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childhood has emerged, causing a power struggle between adult-child relationships, as child is 
acknowledged as a powerful individual whose experiences are to be taken seriously. 
 
 Key words: Child, Childhood, Children’s Rights, Child’s Voice 
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Chapter One 
The Start of the Journey 
1.1  Beginnings 
 
Through the Masters courses I have recently attended, I have become acutely aware of my own 
positioning regarding child and childhood as a Learning Support Specialist. In retrospect, I can identify 
that the way in which I dealt with child in my practice was at the outset firmly located in what is called 
‘the deficit model’ of childhood. I had studied developmental psychology before I started teaching. 
However, when I studied to be a Learning Support Specialist, certain shifts in my own thinking took 
place. I began focusing not so much on the individualised child, but on the social context and the 
importance of contextualised relationships between adults and children.  It is for this reason that I now 
shy away from being called a ‘Remedial Therapist’ 1 and much prefer ‘Learning Support Specialist’.  The 
former emphasises my work as being ‘remedial’ and this brings about the assumption that child has a 
deficit that needs ‘fixing’, and labelling comes with this notion.  In my school practice I do not ‘pull out’ 
pupils for individual work, but work in the classroom setting and I facilitate appropriate interventions 
in consultation with the teachers of those classes in order to support the child within the whole class 
environment.   However, ‘pull-out’ practices still take place in normative situations where institutional 
systems dominate practices. 
 In reading about theories of child and childhood I have come to a deeper understanding of this change 
in how I practise. I have begun to interrogate my view of looking at child 2 through a lens of 
                                                          
1
 Remedial refers to the deficit or medical model where interventions are put in place to remediate or fix a problem 
inherent in the child. The White Paper 6 on Building an Inclusive Education Practice in South Africa used the term Learning 
Support Specialist which leans towards a more ecosystemic approach to viewing child.  Department of Education 
(DoE).2001, White Paper Six: Special Needs Education Building an Inclusive Education and Training System. Pretoria  
2
 I will refer to child throughout this research to construct meanings of child through the different lenses or paradigms from 
different domains e.g. Developmental Psychology, Sociology .Standish in (Bailey 2009, p9) argues that concepts are not 
always “susceptible to a water tight definition’ and mentions that important concepts are contestable as there may be 
disagreement about what ‘their essence is” he draws the distinction between science and philosophy in positing that 
investigating concepts in philosophy are an ‘inevitable part of the human condition’ thus they are open to critique, 
argument, justification and may not always provide ready-made answers.  The philosophy of childhood has become 
recognized as an area of enquiry and there have been numerous writings from the philosophical discourse about child and 
childhood dating back to Socrates.  The concept ‘child’ has invited deeper meanings and questions.   Child is often included 
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developmental psychology. Researchers in the areas of education and childhood have tended to focus 
on the basic assumption that all concepts of child should be viewed through the lens of a biologically 
constructed developmental path that leads from child to adult.  Christensen and James (2008) suggest 
that viewing child from a developmental psychology base has led to researchers incorporating this into 
methodological designs as if it were a ‘natural feature’ of childhood research (Christensen & James, 
2008, p. 156).  There is space for theories of developmental psychology in viewing child, however, 
these theories perceive or view child through different lenses or limited interpretations or 
categorisations. Thus, there is a need to explore other theories that view constructions of child 
differently.  Burman (2008) suggests that developmental psychology needs to be deconstructed in 
order to view it in a critical sense.  There is a strong need to take a fresh, critical approach that 
challenges idealised models of childhood development.  Her work draws on the notion that 
researchers, educators and practitioners need to “identify and evaluate the guiding themes or 
discourses  that structure its current dominant forms” (Burman, 2008, p. 1).  This notion  of 
deconstructing  developmental psychology will be explored further in Chapter Three, where a more in-
depth account of conceptions of child and will be addressed.  
Furthermore, child constructed through the lens of developmental psychology, is both historically and 
culturally conditioned. Kennedy notes that there are questions as to how the “conception of child and 
childhood has changed historically, and how these conceptions differ across cultures” (Kennedy, 2006, 
p. 4).  He suggests that these complex different meanings lead to “scholarly controversy” and 
‘philosophical interest’ (Kennedy, 2006, p. 4).  How child is conceptualized should include the 
relationship between adult and child.  This will be unpacked throughout this research. 
 The beginning of a journey 
 
In my experience of working with children, this journey began with an incident that occurred which 
had a profound effect on my professional practice. Tripp (in Haynes & Murris, 2011, p.297) describes a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
in the writings within philosophy of education (Siegel, 2009)   I will use child and childhood to construct my enquiry 
throughout this research. 
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critical incident as “an episode that needs to be interpreted and interrogated”.   Critical incidents occur 
on two levels, the first being the actual encounter, my observation of Kate3 and the recollection of this; 
the second being the analysis of what this conversation meant and the critical questions it raised about 
my practice and the way in which I acknowledged child.  Even though this incident occurred during my 
day-to-day work with children, it was different as it sparked a change in my thinking about my 
motivation for how I worked and engaged with child.  It is through this analysis that I began to examine 
my assumptions and interactions with child. 
1.2  The significance of this critical incident 
 
Haynes and Murris describe an incident as being critical when it leads to “an increased sensitivity to 
values and a re-examination of implicit beliefs and ideas” (Haynes & Murris, 2011, p. 298).  I relate to 
this quote in terms of my own experience of this incident.   It is through these shifts in my thinking that 
I began to question ways in which I engaged with child within my own practice. I also began to examine 
these shifts through the literature I had become exposed to throughout the Masters courses that I 
attended.  I found myself cognisant of a change in my thinking when in a situation with one of my 
regular young pupils to whom I had been providing support, which turned out to be a foundation on 
which I have based my arguments throughout this research. 
I recalled an incident with eight year old Kate, who was struggling to read basic sight words. I had 
suggested we follow a programme whereby she worked with a few words each day and together we 
played games to help her recognize and more importantly recall the words from memory and then 
identify them in context.  We had been working this way for about three weeks when she suddenly 
took the cards containing the sight words off the table and proceeded to match them to the sight 
words in the text she was reading.  I was thrilled that she was finally recognising the basic sight words 
and I proceeded to give her an extra sticker. What caught my attention was her reply, “You know I hate 
waking up in the morning, because I have to come to school and I find it hard because I am different to 
the others…. I will never get this [the sticker] in the class; I don’t deserve this because here [in the 
                                                          
3
 Name changed to acknowledge confidentiality 
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intervention] I am reading much easier books.  In class I am different and I don’t want to be there 
because I will never be the same as my friends.  My teacher will never give me a sticker as I can’t do 
the work.  I wonder if I will ever get a sticker from my teacher?”.  This powerful voice touched a nerve, 
as I had never asked how she was feeling about her vulnerabilities with reading in class and I assumed 
that what I was intending to do was to motivate and build her confidence. However, hearing her 
authentic voice which gave me a sense of how she was feeling, suddenly opened my eyes to the fact 
that I was not hearing her concerns. I had not been listening to her, as I the [adult] was in control.   
This incident led me to question how we (educators, Learning Support Specialists, educational 
psychologists) begin to negotiate or deliberate over the differences between adult and child and solve 
the moral dilemmas these differences cause. (Murris & Haynes, 2011)  Do adults live in a world that 
allows them to create distance from views expressed by children?  Another incident that motivated my 
research topic occurred between Helen and Tshego4.   During a session, Helen, asked me “Why do 
adults always get served first at the tuck-shop?”  She and her friend Tshego had been ignored, despite 
being at the front of the queue. I asked her what bothered her about this and she replied, “Why do we 
see difference? Is it because we are brought up to know that adults come first?  “Why can’t we be 
served first, as we were there first?” Helen seemed genuinely perplexed by the adult-child relationship.  
Tshego, on the other hand joined in the discussion by saying “We must respect adults”, it’s in our 
religion and our school rules” and thus adopted a more pragmatic [somewhat conditioned] view in her 
response. She seemed to have internalised much of adult discourse about children in her own thinking. 
I allowed the open and honest discussion between the two of them to flow, in my efforts to listen 
responsively to children, rather than giving my opinion or guiding the conversation. They chatted about 
adults and how children should listen to adults [educators and their parents].  They recognised the 
vulnerabilities of adult, when Helen remarked “Adults don’t know everything and they also make 
mistakes and push to the front in queues”.  To this Tshego replied, “Yes, my dad forgot to fetch me one 
day; did he get into trouble that evening when mom came home!” 
 
                                                          
4
 Names changed to protect confidentiality 
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These critical encounters led me to examine the values behind my own practise and highlighted the 
need to explore the way in which I was working with children. It also led me to question the 
significance of adult-child relationships and the impact these have on deciding what is right for child in 
educational contexts. The incidents forced me to question why these voices triggered an emotional 
response and prompted me to question my professional judgement. I began using these incidents with 
the children to question my knowledge and experiences I held as practitioner, by critically analysing 
how these encounters did not always listen to child’s voice nor more importantly, did they interrogate 
what it means to include child’s voice.   
 
I began to question how we (adults) listen to child and became interested in unpacking what the 
concept of voice means and how links could be drawn to evaluate how multiple definitions of child are 
understood and conceptualised with current understandings of children’s rights. It opened up thoughts 
as to how I acknowledge the experiences of child in my own practice.  I started to reflect on how I 
engaged with child; was I assuming child was innocent and in need of protection and adult expertise?  
What would happen if I acknowledged that child has power? And “Was I taking child’s experiences 
seriously? The effect of these encounters with child disrupted my former beliefs and led me to 
question my own conceptualisation of child and more importantly the different conceptions of child, 
through various discourses.   
1.3  Significance of this journey 
 
Through my encounters with Kate, Helen, Tshego and many other children I have worked with. I 
realised that I had to address the ways in which I practised with regard to the new knowledge I had 
been engaging with over the course of the Masters programme and how this new knowledge was 
impacting on my daily practice. This led me to the aim of this research, which is to investigate the need 
by policy-makers, researchers and educators to have a deeper understanding of what it means to listen 
to child’s voice within educational contexts, through the problematisation of the notion of child’s voice 
and what it means to include this. There is an urgent need to explore what we as educators understand 
about what it means to include child’s voice and to shift our assumptions as to how child is 
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conceptualised in school contexts, via our direct interactions with child and through policies and 
pedagogies that dominate educational discourse. Even though this research is conceptual, I have used 
thoughts from the research of McNiff and McCourt (2010) whose work is based on action research, yet 
their central theme links to the experiences I have had as practitioner.  Central to their work is the 
vision of a commitment to democratic education. They emphasise the need for people to speak for 
themselves, drawing on the work of philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) who believed that all 
people are valuable and in occupying their own places on earth, it is their responsibility to speak for 
themselves. My central question is to problematize this responsibility, as I am proposing that child’s 
voice ought to be included in school contexts. 
1.5 Rationale  
 
I chose to investigate conceptualisations of child and childhood which run deep into many different 
discourses. In addition there are cultural differences underlying the wide bodies and schools of thought 
which view child each from ethical, moral, social and anthropological perspectives.  Different 
researchers place different emphases on the adult-child distinction, these emphases contribute to the 
way in which child is defined and treated and raise issues as to the complexities in the different 
conceptualisations of child.  There has been a growing body of research amongst contemporary writers 
about construction of child, to locate child in a position of “being”, rather than “becoming” (Lewis, 
2010).  This means that, depending on which perspective adults adopt, if child is viewed as a 
“becoming” he/she is thus seen as a developing adult in need of support, as he/she has not developed 
the capacities that make a person adult.  If a child is viewed as a “being”, there is an acknowledgement 
that child is viewed as a person who has power and who is capable of participating in matters that 
affect him/her. 
 This new perspective in research has shifted the lenses as to how child is defined and has led to 
questions being asked about acknowledging and hearing the voice of child. The issue of hearing child’s 
voice can be problematised as to how and in what ways or to what extent should child’s voice be 
heard.  Furthermore, research has begun to focus on viewing child as a contributor to research in 
school contexts and this has begun to influence the educational landscapes in many domains.  This 
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research does not focus on doing research with children; however, I will refer to some of the literature 
written by researchers in this field to build up a central argument for the necessity and urgency to 
locate child’s voice in educational discourse.  Child’s voice has not been heard, because of various 
conceptions of child and perceptions of child by adults in positions of power and, more broadly, by 
societal norms and constraints that have silenced this voice.  Adults do not disagree that child’s voice 
should be heard, but rather question what this means and should mean.  This argument has become 
central to many articles written about child’s voice. 
When undertaking research with children, this shift of centering child as a person with voice and rights 
has led to many ethical, moral and methodological dilemmas.  Christensen and James (2008) 
acknowledge that this shift has invited debate amongst researchers working with children as 
participants. They claim that the focus for research involving children should be done with child, rather 
than on child, and therefore needs to include their voice. However, the concept of child’s voice is an 
ambiguous and abstract conception which needs further investigation in order to argue for its rightful 
inclusion in school contexts.    While considering these arguments, it is important to reflect upon what 
the various authors in multi-disciplinary academics fields mean by child and child’s voice.  
Definitions of child and the justification for the inclusion of child’s voice in educational practices can be 
found in legislated Acts, such as the UN Convention of the Rights of Children 1990 Article 12, which 
was ratified by South Africa and a number of international signatories,(excluding the USA and Somalia). 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No 108 of 1996) under Section 28 of the Bill of Rights 
has positioned child as a being who has rights that do not just stop at protection of him/her by adults, 
but extends to allowing child opportunities to make decisions that affect  his/her life.  The South 
African Children’s Act No. 38 of 2005 safeguards a child’s right to “care and protection accommodating 
any special needs that the child may have; and generally, ensuring that the best interests of the child is 
the paramount concern in all matters affecting the child “ (RSA,2005,Articles 7, 18 ) . However, as this 
research will point out, this extension regarding child’s voice and rights is not without its complexities 
and contested constructions of child. For example, Archard (2010) and John (2003) problematise the 
perception that in giving child rights, questions arise in terms of whether certain rights should be 
denied because of child’s lack of understanding of such rights.  They wonder whether child should be 
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given the same rights as adults. This problematisation of the child rights discourse has impacted 
shifting my own assumptions about child and I agree with Archard (2010) and John’s (2003) claims that 
there are still many complexities and questions that we as educators need to examine, with regard to 
how rights are afforded to child and on what grounds.  In this research I refer to conceptions of child 
and children’s rights as it shapes my argument of listening to and hearing child’s voice in a school 
context, as the topic of the children’s rights discourse is too broad to discuss in its entirety. I explore 
the growing criticism of the notions of child’s voice within certain research contexts, with the central 
focus being how child’s voice should be located in matters that affect their lives and education 
contexts. I do, however refer to rights as they are enshrined in legislation, and to policies which place 
obligations on schools to acknowledge the views of child (Lewis, 2007). 
By problematising what child’s voice means and exploring the implications of my conceptual 
investigation, I hope that my research will not only contribute to the justification of the inclusion of an 
approach to teaching and learning called Philosophy for Children (P4C) originally developed by Lipman 
in the 1970’s, but also enrich the acknowledgment of hearing child’s voice within the school context. It 
certainly has influenced my own practice as a learning support specialist and the relationships I have 
with children and the way I listen to child. 
My research focuses on the problematisation of constructions of child according to adult perceptions 
and subjectivities.  I attempted to analyse critically how the assumptions about child and childhood 
have played in academic discourses that view child merely as an object of study, and therefore exclude 
child’s voice. But what is child’s voice and what do we mean that it is often not ‘heard’? By drawing on 
the vast array of literature on child and childhood through the lenses of a number of discourses, I 
identify certain similarities in how child is defined and ‘otherised’ in certain discourses and explore 
what is meant by ‘voice’. I conclude my investigation by putting forward moral and political arguments 
for a different conceptualisation of child that will include child’s voice within certain pedagogies such 
as P4C. 
What does it mean to include child’s voice within educational discourse? I address this central question 
through unpacking the meanings of child and voice.   Literature in favour of placing child’s voice on the 
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agenda of academic debates is becoming more prolific. Rose and Shevlin posit that the time is 
“opportune as the international debate surrounding inclusion strives to maintain a clearer definition of 
issues” (Rose & Shevlin, 2004, p.152).  Allan (2008) and Lewis (2007)  state that researchers need to dig 
deeper in order to research ways of hearing and  listening to child’s voice so that they may facilitate a 
shared vision about how child  should be included in educational discourse that is appropriate to their 
specific needs, notwithstanding the limitations that can arise from this shared vision.  In reviewing the 
literature on child’s voice, I refer to several references to initiatives made by researchers and 
educators, however few, in which child’s voice is heard.  Much research refers to the view that there 
are benefits for child’s voice to be heard, but there is little evidence as to what these are. Researchers 
such as Ainscow (1999, p. 139) believe that child’s “hidden voice has the potential to inform research”. 
Ballard and McDonald (1999, p. 97) recommend that researchers investigating hearing child’s voice 
should look to altering the power relations within research to enable children and young people to 
work together to “create a shared understanding of aspects of their lives.”  
My approach in this report is to engage in an in-depth literature review.  I selected literature that 
contributes to the understanding of child and childhood and child’s voice and which referred to policies 
pertaining to these concepts. 
The issues focused on are the historical, philosophical and psychological views on child  linking these to 
child’s voice and rights. Child’s voice has not been heard because of various constructions of child and 
perceptions of child by adults in positions of power and, more broadly, by societal norms and 
constraints that have silenced this voice.    It is through this survey of literature and the selection of 
current writers such as David Archard, Erica Burman, David Kennedy, Walter Kohan, Mary John, Gareth 
Matthews, Pat Lundy and others that I have selected to build an argument around the debates  that 
foreground conceptions of child and the impact on how adults acknowledge or undervalue child’s voice 
I hope that my research develops ideas that may transform the discourse of education as it is currently 
conceptualised in South Africa.  I do not claim that it will find a solution to the complexities of hearing 
child’s voice, I do hope, however to apply these shifts in my thinking in my own practice as a Learning 
Support Specialist and to see them acknowledged pedagogical practices such as (P4C).   
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1.6 Research Questions 
 
The central question in this research is “What does it mean to include child’s voice in educational 
contexts?   
In order to explore the main research question the following guiding questions will frame this research. 
I. What is child? 
II. What does ‘child’s voice’ mean? 
III. What are the obstacles to hearing child’s voice? 
IV. What are the reasons for including and hearing child’s voice in educational contexts? 
V. How can child’s voice be located in P4C pedagogy? 
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
 
Four constructs are essential to this study: child, childhood; child’s voice and child’s rights. I theorise 
these four notions that are interwoven throughout the literature I use to frame my central argument. I 
begin by defining and theorising these constructs through the diverse meanings shaped by many 
discourses I have referred to, and then attempt to relate it to my argument, in terms of how child’s 
voice can be included in educational contexts.  Thereafter, a more specific discussion of my own shifts 
in my thinking about how I have come to re-think my previous notions of child that suggest there is an 
urgent need to reconceptualise current understandings of child that many educators and theorists 
hold. 
1.8 Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter Two reviews the literature in relation to concepts and conceptions of childhood.  The 
theoretical frame is based on the concept of “What is Child?” and draws from different discourses of 
child and childhood.  In this chapter I draw on these different conceptions of child and childhood and 
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attempt to unpack the underlying assumptions as to how child and childhood differs across cultures, 
political ideologies, and social and moral dimensions.  I argue that modern conceptions of child call for 
a need to reconceptualise how child is positioned in the schooling context and in wider society.  I begin 
to develop the adult-child dichotomy which is drawn upon throughout this research. 
In Chapter Three I critically discuss Developmental Psychology and the growing interest amongst 
researchers to move beyond this paradigm that views child according to biological maturation and a 
stage theory based on age.  I introduce the work of Erica Burman, Alison Gopnik, David Kennedy, 
Gareth Matthews and others who argue that there is a need to deconstruct developmental psychology 
as it is positioned as a dominant discourse in modern schooling.  Hence they, suggest a move away 
from a domination of Piagetian theories when viewing child in a school context.  I consider the 
arguments put forward by these researchers and show how their work has influenced a shift in my 
thinking about how I view and deal with child in my professional practice. 
Chapter Four further develops the work of  David Archard, Erica Burman, Gareth Matthews and David 
Kennedy and draws on other philosophers working in the discourse of philosophy of child who 
conceptualise child as a capable individual and who suggest the need for a strong call to 
reconceptualise the meaning of childhood.  I present an overview of the programme P4C developed by 
Matthew Lipman in the 1970’s and contrast this with conceptions of childhood from a Developmental 
Psychology discourse that has dominated school practice for decades.  I draw on proponents of the 
P4C and more contemporary Philosophy with Children (PwC) to argue that a rethinking of child as 
having a critical voice and being capable of much more than many adults’ perceptions of child is 
necessary to bring about opportunities to include child’s voice. 
Chapter Five explores the notion of voice and the recent research undertakings that suggest there is a 
heightened need to include and listen to child’s voice. The latter is also linked to the rights discourse 
which will be touched on in this chapter and then elaborated on in Chapter Six.  I draw on the concept 
voice and discuss the assumptions and challenges the concept voice has in theory and practice.  I 
develop the notion of how important it is to create a culture of listening in a school context in order to 
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facilitate a greater acknowledgement of child’s voice.  I discuss obstacles that highlight the 
complexities of listening to and acknowledging child’s voice. 
Chapter Six discusses the discourse of Children’s Rights and highlights the central debates that emerge 
when considering whether children ought to have rights.  I discuss the rights discourse from two 
perspectives, the first being through a liberal discourse and the second, and an opposing liberal 
caretaking theory.  Drawing on the discourse of children’s rights, I discuss the suggested middle- 
ground between the liberal discourse and liberal caretaking theory, namely, the pragmatist ideology. 
Drawing on the work of David Archard and Mary John and other advocates of children’s rights.  I use 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children to provide a conceptual framework of how 
the need for children’s rights became established as an important agenda when conceptualising child 
and childhood.  I link the rights discourse to the need for protection of child and its opposing concept 
of autonomy. I argue that through acknowledgement of children’s rights and allowing child to 
participate and be consulted on matters affecting him/ a number of complexities and assumptions are 
laid bare that raise important debates amongst researchers with regard to consulting with child.  If 
child’s voice is not heard or considered by adult then child is excluded and undervalued. There is a 
strong need to examine the rights discourse pertaining to children, not through the eyes of 
individualistic bias, but rather to consider that cultural norms play an important role in how child is 
treated and responded to by adult. 
Chapter Seven summarises the main arguments for and against including child’s voice by referring to 
the many domains where child and child’s voice ought to be included in educational contexts.  
Complexities within the discourse of childhood are summarised and argued by referring to a paper 
Fragments of an Endless Conversation on Childhood, a dialogue between David Kennedy and Walter 
Kohan who discuss the conceptions of childhood as being an endless conversation. The chapter 
includes my reflections whilst writing this report and provides anecdotal experiences of my work with 
children over the years.  I refer to limitations of this research and suggest ways in which new ideas for 
further research have emerged from my study.  
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Chapter Two    
Conceptions of Childhood 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Questions about child and childhood, the nature of child, and how child should be included in society, 
are central to education. Answers to these questions are assumed in the pedagogies and resources we 
use as educators, and how we conceptualise and negotiate the relationships with our learners.  
Concepts of child and childhood carry discursive beliefs and assumptions about what the purpose of 
childhood is, and therefore, what the aims of education should be based, upon these assumptions.   
Childhood theories are informed by social, political, and economic ideologies and this will be explored 
through a discussion of various key theorists.  These theories of child and childhood shape the way in 
which child is treated: as an individual, and in social contexts such as families, communities and 
educational contexts.  Many discourses are problematic in that the particular constructions of child and 
childhood are produced, assumed or informed by a particular policy or educational practice.  As a 
result of the prevailing discourses, marginalization or domination by adult over child, in matters that 
may affect child’s status as an individual with rights, may occur. Both Kennedy (2006b) and Kohan 
(2011) argue for an expansive understanding of the child-adult concept in relation to one another, in 
terms of a causal model.  This notion of causality of adult-child will be investigated further in this 
chapter.  
Kennedy (2000, 2006b) points out that one cannot help moving away from the conceptual relationship 
between adult-child. There is a reliance on one another. However, he refers to a space in between the 
child and adult that needs to be explored.  Child in educational contexts has been conceptually isolated 
from adult into a category of its own and it is this construction that assumes the role that adult is 
supposed to play and this role influences how we [adults] value listening to child’s voice.  The 
problematisation of certain conceptions of childhood may unsettle dominant policies and practices (by 
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hearing only adult voice) and therefore challenge existing practices and policies in school contexts, 
specifically when including child’s voice. 
My research concerning the concepts of ‘child’ and ‘childhood’ reveals the various assumptions 
brought to these concepts in academic literature - border crossing many disciplines such as 
developmental psychology, anthropology, history, sociology of childhood, children’s literature, and 
philosophy of childhood.  Furthermore, these conceptualisations extend beyond mere academic 
discourses into different social and cultural practices, which have direct practical implications for 
children’s lives, of an ethical, moral, religious, and political nature.   
The complexity involved in enquiries about the meaning of the concepts child and childhood, and the 
increasing interest in doing research with, rather than on children (itself an expression of a particular 
conception of childhood) has heightened the need for researchers and practitioners, to re-examine 
their standpoints and assumptions. This report will not explicitly cover research with children; 
however, refer to areas within the discourse of doing research with children that relate to conceptions 
of child and child’s voice.  For the sake of both adults and children, there is a need to rethink the 
conception of childhood in order to question the assumptions involved in how we view child and what 
child ‘is’.  Discussion of the concept of ‘child’ will be elaborated in this chapter; however, it is important 
first to discuss the various ways in which childhood has been conceptualised. 
2.2 Child in Historical perspective 
 
Contemporary understandings of childhood are largely based upon the work of Philippe Aries (1914-
1984). He has created opportunities for many theorists reading his work, to contest question, probe 
hidden assumptions, and formulate ideas as to how the concepts of child and childhood are used in 
society.  Aries (1962) argued that childhood did not exist until after the Middle Ages.  He posited that 
childhood was a momentary period of dependency, which was of no special significance to the society 
at that time.  Child was thus an infant for a period and then became a small adult who participated 
fully in all activities in the adult world.  There was no separation of child and adult during this period.  
According to Aries, childhood is a relatively new concept and emerged as a distinctive stage in the 
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upper classes only in the 16th and 17th centuries, and later became more significant in the 18th century.  
It was only at the beginning of the 20th century that childhood, as a stage, was identified as distinct and 
different from adult in upper and middle classes of Western society.  
Aries did not make a claim that there were no young people in existence during these periods; instead, 
he argues that the Western cultures did not have a concept of childhood.  His work described the stage 
of infancy rather than that of child. Due to the high occurrence of infant mortalities, the focus of his 
writing was about the rearing of infants and their position in society.  In the Middle Ages, children were 
viewed as infants up until the age of 7, whereupon they were then apprenticed to become workers.  
Furthermore, Aries bases his argument on the evidence contained in the study of artwork of the time, 
which depicted infants, rather than children.  In artwork, children were portrayed as miniature adults.  
According to Aries therefore, childhood is a historical creation. He wrote that the institution of 
childhood began to materialise when the position of the young person began to change in society.  
 It is through a modern conception of childhood that “child’s world was viewed as innocent and adult 
was one of knowing” (Archard, 2010, p. 37).  Thus, it was believed that child should be sheltered from 
the adult world, and events such as death and tragedy were hidden from the child.  Child had 
previously been exposed to adult sexual behaviours while in a modern conception of childhood, this is 
deemed morally offensive.  Of course, this does not mean that child is not exposed to adult behaviours 
in contemporary society.   There is a strong body of advocacy around the protection of children’s 
rights, specifically, in terms of abuse, the training of child soldiers and issues that arise out of the HIV- 
pandemic that has changed the role of child into adult.  These issues are pertinent to how we 
conceptualise childhood; however, within the scope of this research the focus on these issues will be 
limited. 
2.3 Modern conceptions of Childhood 
 
Contemporary philosophers such as David Kennedy, Gareth Matthews and Andrew Stables have 
focused their research on the discourse of philosophy of childhood, toward an interpretation that 
suggests a heightened need for researchers and practitioners to extend their thinking beyond empirical 
 25 
 
P
ag
e2
5
 
 
research to matters of child, schooling and adults rights in making decisions for children.  Their studies 
on child and childhood from a philosophical perspective question the empirical findings in order to 
problematise the assumptions made and raise questions for philosophical enquiry. They suggest that 
viewing children as objects raises philosophical questions, but also raise other philosophical questions, 
such as, does all schooling benefit individuals and societies? Their theories challenge researchers and 
practitioners to look beyond the traditional constructs of childhood (written from a Western 
philosophical perspective) and argue that there is an urgent need to reconceptualise childhood.  
Stables, for example, argues that “conceptions of childhood have been insufficiently challenged in 
recent times” (Stables, 2008, p. 2). This quote suggests that there is not enough rigour amongst 
scholars, therefore conceptions of childhood need to be challenged in order to change our 
assumptions about child. Viewing childhood from a Western perspective has come under critique from 
post-modern writers, who contend that conceptions of child in the domains of history, sociology, and 
philosophy have viewed child as a marginalised object, and like women and slaves, they are portrayed 
as inferior in society.  
One reason suggested for this reconceptualization of childhood is the argument that childhood should 
not be defined merely by age.  French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) described 
childhood as an “age of nature” occurring between birth and twelve years.  Biological-anthropologists 
claim that childhood is a stage of growth that serves a purpose, that is, preparation for adulthood.  
From the perspective of sociology of childhood, according to James and Prout (1997), the 
‘chronological age’ argument is of little use, when comparing conceptions of childhood among 
different cultures and societies.  This new sociology of childhood identifies childhood as a “plurality of 
childhoods” rather than a structured conditional term (James and Prout, 1997).  This “plurality of 
childhood” expresses the idea (akin to Archard’s idea of conceptions) that different societies may 
define child differently. For example, in one society “a ten year old may be seen as a school child and in 
another as head of a household” (Burke, 2008, p. 1).  The differences as to how child is treated by 
different cultures leads to the argument of cultural relativism , in which proponents of this argument 
suggest that because child is living in diverse communities and contexts, there cannot be a ‘one-size-
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fits all’ approach to conceptualising child, as cultural traditions and ideologies pertaining to child differs 
from society to society. 
Other theories of childhood are also based on the currently popular idea that childhood is a modern 
invention.  Therefore, Aries’s view of childhood is contentious and critiqued by Archard (2010), who 
makes an important distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’.  He argues that because Aries’s 
work was the first of its kind to provide an historical account of childhood, it was not without flaws.    
He rejects Aries’s claim that it was not until the 17th century that a concept of childhood began to 
emerge.   
Drawing on the Rawlsian distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’, Archard (2010) argues that 
Aries’ concept of child lacked the modern concept of child as we now define it.  Archard (2010) 
describes the concept of childhood to be understood as the difference or distinction between child and 
adult which is linked to the attributes that are often unstipulated and not articulated.  He defines a 
conception of childhood as specifying these attributes.  In this way, suggests that if one “has a concept 
of childhood we recognize that children differ interestingly from adults; to have a conception of 
childhood is to have a view of what those interesting differences are” (Archard, 2010, p. 27). What has 
been important for me to consider is, Burman’s claim that developmental psychology, has failed to 
take into consideration the distinction of child and adult, in that it singles out child, as an “ideal-typical 
subject” (Burman, 2008,p. 31).   It is this view that has dominated my practice as an educator where 
these normative frameworks view child as a naturalized subject. Normative frameworks inhibit the 
differences cause by cultural, historical, class, sexual and gendered locations. Thus the formation of 
childhood is predetermined. 
The ways in which we know child are subject to the view of how we balance the adult-child polarity.  In 
the Middle Ages adult was, in many ways viewed as “childlike or childish” (Kennedy, 2006b, p. 109; 
Friquegnon, 1997 p. 47). In the Romantic period, child was defined by memories of the adult’s 
childhood and this in itself, is problematic as these memories are disjointed, or “shaped by cultural-
historical discourse” (Kennedy, 2006b, p. 109).  This notion of culture and its importance in defining 
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childhood, has been a theme amongst most of the authors referred to in this research, namely Burman 
(2008, 2009), Friquegnon (1997) and Kennedy (2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). 
Liberal perspectives of the conceptions of child, view adult as dominant or paternalistic this argument 
is posed by Archard (2010, p. 78), when he draws on the notion that this ‘”caretaker thesis” in which 
adult deciding for child.  Furthermore, child is deemed not competent to make these decisions.  The 
argument advocates “how they (children) should choose” (Archard, 2010, p. 78).  This claim, according 
to Archard, presents an interesting argument as adult, is assumed to be the rational being, and 
therefore reinforces the view that child is a non-participant in society. The “caretaker thesis” will be 
further developed in chapter six. 
Furthermore, “childhood becomes a set of multiple emotional as well as political investments: a 
repository of hope yet a site of instrumentalisation for the future, but with an equal and opposite 
nostalgia for the past” (Burman, 2008, p. 11). This is not a simple conception; different discourses 
construct different meanings, and therefore childhood is not just a state of human development.  
Different constructs of child and childhood question the positioning of child according to moral, 
political, and legal status, not just the placement of child in society by adults’ views about how adult 
acknowledges child.  
In sum, theories of childhood are concerned with conceptions of child, i.e. the attributes we bring to 
our notions of what a child is, the nature of childhood, its purpose, function, and how societies and 
cultures view the notions of child and childhood.  Following Archard (2010), these conceptions are 
always contestable and defined in relation to our conceptions of what an adult and adulthood is. In the 
Middle Ages there was a conception of childhood, but simply very different from our contemporary 
understandings. Therefore, concepts of child and childhood are not modern inventions. They have 
always existed, but are defined differently in time and space and, as a result, a complex web of varied 
meanings of the concepts child and childhood has been created in and across various disciplines and 
historical periods. 
Childhood has also been defined in legal terms, this emerged with the industrialisation of nations and 
the recognition of childhood as a stage, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.   This 
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development was significant in shifting the association of childhood with the world of labour and 
positioning childhood in the context of education (Burman, 2008). Child became defined in terms of 
serving the capitalistic notions of the society, child is thus seen as economically viable as a labour force, 
rather than attending school to get an education.   A political critique of this development led to child 
viewed not as an object who is “economically viable or useful but rather to child who is valued as an 
emotionally priceless being” (Burke, 2008, p. 2).  These theories and ideas about child development led 
to societies introducing compulsory education; this notion will be developed further in Chapter Five 
when discussing child’s voice.    
2.4 What is Child? 
 
The question “What is child?” can be understood as an empirical question. Child can be categorised as 
a human being that has a small body in the real world that we can hear, see, smell and which possesses 
human characteristics. Adults also have been child in this sense once and have grown into adult bodies. 
Empirical child is more vulnerable as his or her body is less developed and capable than that of an 
adult, and therefore he/she in need of protection by adults.  Friquenon (1997) suggests that we should 
be able to answer the question “what is child?” fairly easily, as child makes up every facet of everyday 
life in all societies; however, she argues that we do not fully know how to understand child, or more 
importantly, what is means to be a child.  She claims that our current notion of childhood is 
“incomplete and open-ended” (Friquenon, 1997, p. 14). She argues that childhood is viewed as a 
normative process: a preparation for a period (adulthood) not yet reached.  She suggests that there is a 
need to distinguish between concrete and abstract notions of child.  Drawing on Hegel’s notion of ‘a 
concrete idea’ she suggests that in order to problematize the question “what is child?’ there needs to 
be both a concrete knowledge of child, which encompasses the detailed and scientific knowledge of 
child in relation to adults and a need for having an abstract knowledge about child.  The concept of 
child thus also involves an embodied individual who is not yet adult, and who is therefore concrete as 
linguistically expressed in ‘a child’ or ‘children’ (Friquenon, 1997).   By contrast, the concept of 
childhood is always abstract and normative as it suggests the status ascribed to a period of time where 
child is not afforded adult status (Archard’s notion of ‘conceptions’).  Thus, the concept childhood 
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varies and shifts in meanings.  It is described in a number of ways; some adults may describe childhood 
in terms of ages, others by maturity and physical development or legal status.  Furthermore, Friquenon 
(1997) mentions that there are assumptions and questions to be raised as to what is involved in 
‘preparation’ for adult.  
The concept child is often viewed in terms of inferiority, dependency and powerlessness.  Childhood 
focuses on a more general state of being.  Its focus is on a collective group described at that stage, 
rather than an individual being.  Childhood is therefore a distinct group or category from adult.  Its 
meaning is constructed by the binary relationship with adulthood, which is a universal notion. A 
universal notion of childhood has tended to dominate the way in which child is defined. This has 
caused a difficulty among many adults to avoid thinking in terms of the dichotomies child-adult that 
has brought about different meanings of child and childhood 
From an historical perspective, it can be argued that the idea of childhood has not always been there, 
as its meaning depends on social and cultural boundaries, and therefore its conception is discursive 
and diverse.  It is this historical construction that has raised different ideas as to how, child is perceived 
and treated by adults and how over periods of time, these ideas have changed.  As mentioned above, 
Aries (1962) claimed childhood was a social and historical construction, rather than a biological or 
natural construction (as, for example, the developmental psychologist Piaget claimed). 
The implications for education in terms of how child and childhood are constructed suggest that 
representations of childhood are seen through adult eyes. Childhood is constructed from adult beliefs 
and insights about children and childhood and these have shifted over time. 
2.5 Post-Modern views of childhood 
 
Kennedy (2006b) argues that a post-modern view of childhood has created a complex relation between 
what we were [our childhood] and what they are [child]. He suggests that this has been constructed by 
universal compulsory schooling.  He draws on Bachelard’s writings on childhood, and claims that “the 
childhood of the adult is an invention of sorts” (cited in Kennedy, 2006b, p. 57). If childhood is an 
invention then it is relative to the adult’s own unique experiences and perceptions, it cannot then be a 
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universal construct, as childhoods are different and unique to each person and linked to cultural, 
social, political and economic contexts. I agree with Bachelard (in Kennedy, 2006b) who makes a strong 
argument against a universal notion of childhood.  Bachelard defines “childhood as whatever the 
experience of one’s particular childhood” Kennedy (2006b, p. 11). Kennedy provides a deeper 
questioning of Bachelard’s claim as he suggests that there are “interstices” within an adult-child 
relationship. It is through these possibilities in the relationship between child and adult, and the 
different ways in which we construct school that it becomes possible to reconceptualise child.   These 
‘interstices’ represent the complex relationship between adult and child.  They expose the gap 
between what we as adult were and what children are.  Kennedy suggests that it is through these 
‘interstices’ that possibilities arise for questioning and exposing assumptions that we hold when 
defining childhood. 
In questioning childhood, three disciplinary fields have been historically central, namely, 
developmental psychology, sociology, and pedagogy.  In the human sciences, child has become a 
serious object of study and much of the pedagogy around child focuses on this in terms of policy and 
practice in schools and institutions.  Kennedy (2006b, p. 73) argues that the questions raised about 
child are from the adult.  Furthermore, he posits that [mostly] the “study of child is an extension of 
science of biology”.  He acknowledges that this is problematic and leads to negative perceptions of 
child. He suggests that questions should be asked “of and to children and the childhood that it leaves 
out” (Kennedy, 2006b, p. 74). 
Using the concept thick5, Kennedy (2006a, 2006b) argues that this view of child is more dynamic than 
the view of child as a statistical norm - child as viewed through a scientific lens.  His argument is that 
this narrow scientific framework neutralises child and he argues that this goes deeper than an 
epistemological problem: it becomes a political one too.  He uses the term “hegemonic” to describe 
this adult framework of using science as a dominant discourse when viewing child.  In this way, there is 
then no need for [adult] to problematize these knowledge claims and Kennedy argues that this is the 
                                                          
5
 Philosophers tend to look for particular words or concepts when developing arguments.  On the one hand there are thin 
concepts that are general in nature e.g. ‘good’ ‘bad’ ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.  On the other hand there are thick concepts that 
express “a union of fact and value” e.g. treacherous, cruel or honest. See: Blomberg, 2007) Nordic Journal of Philosophy 8 
(2) ,63-78. 
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reason that (adult) researchers do not investigate the underlying philosophical assumptions about 
these knowledge claims.  This suggests that a culture of “direct knowers” rather than “understanding 
ourselves as interpreters” is dominant in the discourses of child study. 
Kennedy (2006a, 2006b) argues that constructions of child have a philosophical basis.  In order to 
deconstruct child as the object of scientific study, he claims that there is a need to decentre ourselves 
from this normative account of child to allow other perspectives of child to come into play.  This raises 
the complexity of how we question child Kennedy (2006b, p.91) proposes that there is a need to ask, 
questions as to what the meaning of child is, what child has meant in different historical periods and 
what might child mean in a contemporary society, specifically through the eyes of the adult.  His claim 
suggests that adults perceive child through an adult world and need to dig deeper in order to question 
assumptions as to how child is conceptualised in this adult world. This argument exposes the notion 
that adult constructs a child’s world.  The question “What can adults know about children and how?”  
(Kennedy, 2006b, p. 91) is central to the study of child, as our positioning as adult is dominant and it is 
from this position that adults view children and childhood. 
Child is always described in relation to adult. Kennedy (2006b, p. 100) describes “childhood and 
adulthood as a bipolar concept”. The boundaries of these two concepts are viewed differently, 
culturally and historically.  Culturally, child is constructed differently across cultural divides and 
although one culture may seem “childlike” in adult western eyes, in contrast, adults in Western culture 
may be defined differently through the lens of non-Western adults.  Friquegnon (1997) claims that the 
terms ‘childlike’ and ‘childish’ are often confused in that they suggest that these qualities of childhood 
are incompatible with adulthood.  She suggests that we have not yet fully understood what it is to be 
child.  There is a need to address issues as to how we problematise what mode of education is suitable 
to child. This uncertainty regarding education has brought about an “inadequacy of our understanding 
of childhood”. Friquegnon’s argument is central to the notion that childhood cannot be viewed as a 
fixed stage and that it can only be partially defined. 
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2.6 Adult-Child  
 
Educational theorists have examined the effect of dichotomies of male/female, middle class/working 
class, white/black, bright/average in educational contexts on the experiences of children positioned as 
‘other’.  The dichotomy of adult-child has only recently come to the fore.  The argument I wish to raise 
is that because of this construction of adult-child being different to one another, child is often 
marginalised and seen as ‘other’.  In terms of policy and curriculum this construction of child as ‘other’ 
has influenced how adults regard children’s capabilities.  Recently, research into the impact of these 
dichotomies, in particular on the effects of the learning contexts and experiences of children, who 
have been constructed as ‘other’, has been undertaken by hooks6 (in Cooper, 2006).  However, Cooper 
(2006) argues that the adult-child dichotomy has not been sufficiently addressed or investigated in 
terms of its educational significance.  John (2003) has also taken up this issue of adult-child 
relationships by suggesting that there needs to be a transformation of power between adult and child. 
Her argument is that this starts when child has his/her own engagement with the world.  She argues 
that children do not need their “realities interpreted, or their needs defined by adults who see the 
world in a different way. “Their (children’s) power lies in defining their own world” (John, 2003, p. 
188). This quote raises important questions and shakes assumptions about how adult’s domination of 
child has shaped the way in which child is treated and acknowledged by society, specifically in 
schooling, where there is much talk of democracy and rights.  The notion that children’s power lies in 
their ability to define their own world, argued by John, links to Kennedy’s question as to what adults 
can know about children and how, as was discussed previously. Both researchers suggest that adults 
need to re-examine their assumptions and their control they exert over child. In practice, it is the adult 
world that dominates and shapes policies and systems that are based on principles of adult- knows 
what is best for child. 
Furthermore, this notion of adult-child dichotomies has generated wide interest in how we recognize 
the difference between children and adults.  Archard (2010) argues that although cultures do possess 
                                                          
6
 hooks, the researcher’s name, is not capitalized in the literature.  
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a concept of childhood and define clear distinctions between adult and child, the differences are far 
less dramatic than is implied by the current conception of childhood.  
There is a strong argument specifically in educational contexts to recognize the ‘inner’ child or child’s 
identity.  If educators speak about the identity of children, it is problematic to do so without taking 
into account the role adults play in shaping childhood identity (Cooper, 2006).  This claim has 
profound effects on how child is acknowledged and conceptualised in educational contexts.  If adults 
remain the dominant force in shaping childhood identity, then how do these identities limit child’s 
participation in school contexts? 
It is important then to consider that the dichotomy between childhood and adulthood is not only 
problematized in education, but, across cultures, the dichotomy is played out in political, social, 
religious and legal domains. These different lenses provide researchers with a broader view of the 
conceptualisations of childhood. In the new field of philosophy of childhood, Stables (2008) argues 
that how we think about childhood will have a strong bearing on how policies are theorised, especially 
those relating to children. More importantly, these philosophical reflections inform how policies are 
formulated as to how we should educate children.  Furthermore, drawing on Hume and Wittgenstein, 
Stables (2008, p. 1) argues that there is a notion that practitioners and researchers cannot move 
“unproblematically from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’ in adult-child relations or any sphere of life”. This 
amounts to committing the ‘naturalistic fallacy’7: from whatever adult thinks child ‘is’, it does not 
follow that therefore child should be treated in a particular way without further justifications or 
reasons offered.   
It is this dichotomy of child-adult that has influenced my own thoughts about how I practise.  It has 
profoundly shifted my assumptions and beliefs as to how I view child in practice, how I view myself as 
adult and how I, as adult, position myself when working with child.  It has created a conflict within in 
my own professional growth.  I find myself torn between paradigms of developmental psychology that 
have shaped my practice over twenty years, and a new paradigm of philosophy of child that questions 
                                                          
7
 A naturalistic fallacy addresses the ‘nature’ of what is natural and what is not natural. If a person, in this case adult 
equates child to be a lesser individual than adult.   The adult thus perceives him/herself to be higher or better, and thus 
implies qualitative judgements upon child, who is seen to be lower.  
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the rigour of this scientific approach, which categorised, and in many ways shaped, how child is 
regarded by adult.  Adult has dominated perceptions of how child should act, and what is best for the 
child.  I am now questioning how I view child as a practitioner and my perspective is changing as I 
become more aware that child has capabilities of thinking, acting, and speaking in ways that I would 
never have expected if I had not started to question my own assumptions.  
It is clear that the notion of childhood is interwoven with the corresponding idea of schooling. In order 
to develop this further, a link between ‘the nature’ of child, perceived as different from adult needs 
further investigation. The lens of developmental psychology will be the focus in the next chapter.  
As has been described previously, there is a need to identify by some means the cultural significance of 
childhood by linking childhood to social and cultural origins.  Viewing child in different historical and 
cultural contexts needs to be separated from biological reduction.  This relates to the previous 
discussion of Archard’s distinction between a ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ of childhood.  In order to 
develop my argument further I return to the terms ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ of childhood. A ‘concept’ 
of childhood refers to the unspecified differences between adult and child, whereas a ‘conception’ of 
childhood, clearly specifies what these differences entail. 
The ‘concept’ of childhood refers to the principle of difference whereas the ‘conception’ of childhood 
provides the details as to what that concept means in any given society. 
My understanding of this distinction between ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions’, is that a ‘concept’ thus 
leads one to think about the universal difference between adult and child.  A ‘conception’ of childhood 
therefore suggests that there is a need to problematize the universal differences in the meanings of 
childhood, which may be shaped by a particular culture or society.  Archard’s (2010) distinction 
between ‘concept’ and ‘conceptions’ of childhood raises the question “What is childhood?”.  This 
question assumes that there are different views and beliefs of child and childhood depending on 
historical and cultural backgrounds.  By asking “what is childhood?” significantly arouses one’s 
attention to the different conceptions of childhood.  In doing so, one is forced to ponder questions that 
arise, such as “when do children become adults?” and “how do different societies define when child is 
to be given adult status?” 
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Furthermore, Archard (2010) draws on another aspect where he discusses childhood in terms of 
‘boundaries and ‘dimensions’.  Childhood, in this regard is thus made up of a beginning and an ending.  
The argument raised by Archard (2010) proposes that adult-child boundaries are therefore defined by 
societies through the lens of a particular perspective or dimension and that childhood is thus defined 
according to the way in which different cultures define it.  He argues that these boundaries created 
between child and adult are problematic to anyone of a different culture wishing to define childhood 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Aries’s (1962) work has had a significant impact on the study of childhood.  Despite many criticisms of 
his theory and ideas about childhood, from my reading of his work I am able to see that his work has 
created a foundation on which other researchers and writers from different domains have based their 
theories.  It is through his work that researchers have begun to problematize notions of childhood and 
continue to do so.  In this chapter I have made the important distinction between concept and 
conceptions of child. Childhood is not simply a social construction, but also includes the physical, 
biological dimension: children as empirical, embodied individuals. Childhood, it has been argued, is a 
social, biological and historical construction that changes over time and place. 
Contemporary thinkers, such as Archard (2010), Kennedy (2000; 2008) , Kohan (2008) and Friquegnon 
(1997), have begun to question profoundly what concepts such as child and childhood mean, and how 
reconstructions of child and childhood are essential in understanding how child is represented in 
society and in modern schooling.  
It is apparent that what is missing from most accounts of child and childhood through the disciplines of 
history, psychology, sociology and philosophy, are the children.  Much of the literature and theorising 
about child and childhood are conceived through the lens of adult’s own experiences of their 
childhoods and their observations of child. There is no denial that children may possess different 
features to adult but; there is still nonetheless a need to be aware of how adult response to their 
differences has changed over time. I will continue to pick up on this argument in the next chapter, 
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where developmental psychology is discussed in terms of the assumptions that have been entrenched 
in educational theory for decades. 
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Chapter Three  
Child through a lens of Developmental Psychology  
3.1 Introduction 
 
Childhood, defined as a natural biological stage of development, is central to the influential writings of 
Jean Piaget (1896-1980), who developed his theory of genetic epistemology.  His research suggested 
that in order for a child to develop cognitively, he/she would have to move through four stages of 
development based on maturation from one stage to the next.  Piaget (1972) proposed that a child 
learns through the development of thought processes which influence the way in which he/she 
interacts or understands the world.  Piaget suggested that a child is an active participant in his/her 
learning and that there is an active construction of knowledge and understanding of this world.  His 
work centred on the biological notions of “how we come to know” (Piaget, 1972 p. 121).  He outlined 
key concepts relevant to learning during each stage of development.  Development, according to 
Piaget is guided by the principles of adaptation and organisation.  Piaget (1972)8 believed that humans 
possess mental structures often called schema, which assimilate external events and convert them to 
fit their mental structures.  Any changes to the existing environments or events need to be 
accommodated into new and changing aspects, of the external environment.  Piaget believed that as 
these schemas become more complex, they are organized in a hierarchical structure from general to 
specific.  Despite these strong arguments and evidence put forward by proponents of theories of 
developmental psychology, many critics (Burman, 2009; Kennedy, 2006) of developmental psychology 
                                                          
8
 Piaget’s Key concepts  as to how child learns are as follows: 
• Adaptation: adapting to the world through assimilation and accommodation 
• Assimilation: the process by which a person takes material into their mind from the environment, which may 
mean changing evidence of the senses to make it fit. 
• Accommodation-the difference made to one's mind or concepts by the process of assimilation 
• Equilibration: when an individual strikes a balance between assimilation and accommodation through a 
mechanism called equilibration. 
As a child moves through the stages of cognitive development, there is a balance between applying previous 
knowledge( assimilation) and changing behaviour to account for new knowledge (accommodation)  (Donald, 
Lazarus and Lolwana, 2010) 
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have voiced extensive concerns about the dominance of theories of developmental psychology in 
shaping how child is constructed in school contexts. 
The child, as defined by Piaget, moves through predictable and clearly defined stages, which are 
chronologically ordered9.  His theory of development clearly illustrates that the child moves from 
infant to adulthood through a sequencing of different conceptual levels.  The child thus moves into the 
next stage when there is a mastering of the previous stage.  This is the theory that has shaped my 
professional practice and still dominates educational policies and practices.  In reviewing literature that 
critiques Piagetian ideas, I have come to examine my own assumptions about theories of child 
development. 
A critic of Piaget, Jenks (2010, p. 25) rejects Piaget’s theory of childhood development stating that “the 
child is abandoned in the theory” as it is grounded in scientific rationality. He states that child in 
Piagetian theory has been “wrenched from the possibility of difference…and integrated into the 
tyrannical realm of fact”.  Jenks’ claims that Piaget’s notion that all children develop, through a 
mastery of different stages, undermines children’s individuality. He argues that these notions shut 
down opportunities to question possibilities of profound difference, and instead, normalise and 
standardise child as an object of study. 
Hence, Piaget would define developmental psychology as a study of development of child according to 
the development of child’s mental functions, at each stage of development.  It is within each stage that 
particular developments occur which the child fits into his/her existing mental functions in order to 
reach the next stage of development.   For Piaget, development is universal in that all children will 
develop or mature according to specific stages or competencies.  It is the term competencies, that has 
raised criticism from sociologists and philosophers, who suggest that Piaget was incorrect in assuming 
                                                          
9
 Piaget’s Stages of Development (ibid) 
Sensorimotor: between the ages 0-2 here the infant tries to make sense of the world via the senses and motor activities. 
Preoperational: between the ages of 2-6.- Language is the distinguishing feature of development in this stage. Child does 
not yet understand concrete logic or mentally manipulate information.  Egocentricity dominates child’s world. 
Concrete Operational: between the ages of 7-11 here child gains a better understanding of mental operations and begins 
to think logically about concrete events. Abstract and hypothetical concepts are a difficulty at this stage 
Formal Operational Stage: from the age of 12 to adult.  During this time the child begins to develop the ability to think 
abstractly.  Skills such as logical thought, deductive reasoning begin to emerge during this stage. 
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that children have limited cognitive capacities, based on chronology and specific stages.   For Piaget, 
the development occurs through “child’s mastery and transcendence of schemata at each stage” 
(Jenks, 2010 p.12).  His claim is that theories of developmental psychology are too hegemonic and he 
(among many other theorists), draws on a strong critique that developmental psychology has “failed to 
attend to, or even acknowledge its own paradoxical character” (Jenks, 2010 p.3). 
3.2 Deconstructing child:  Multiple voices of critics of Developmental Psychology 
 
Matthews (1996) much like Jenks problematises developmental theories, when he discusses child in 
the light of the moral theories of development (similar to Kohlberg’s in particular, who is also a 
Piagetian developmental psychologist).  He does not say that moral development is unhelpful; 
however, he posits that these theories often “distance ourselves from children” (Matthews, 1996, 
p.66) thus suggesting that these theories need to be handled purposefully and carefully.  Much like 
Jenks’s critique above, Matthews demands that adult look more critically at who the ‘masters’ are: 
theories about development or us [adults]. He suggests that looking at children and ourselves can be a 
risky practice,   in that adults position themselves as the knowing experts within these theories, 
therefore distancing child rather than acknowledging that child is capable of knowing.  Matthews 
(1996a, p. 67) poignantly states: 
“Any developmental theory that rules out, on purely theoretical grounds, even the possibility 
that we as adults may occasionally have something to learn, morally from a child, for that 
reason: defective; it is also morally offensive”.   
Feminist philosopher, Fricker (2007) would agree with Matthews’s term ‘morally offensive’ in that 
adults positioning themselves as masters of a developmental theory are committing what she terms an 
‘epistemic injustice’.  There is a moral transgression on the part of the adult in the capacity of the 
knower that places judgements and normative conceptions upon the child.   The child is therefore not 
part of the knowledge that informed adult theories, and in this way an ‘epistemic injustice’ is done.    
Matthews (1996) further challenges the Piagetian theory of developmental psychology that 
presupposes adults’ view of children as different from themselves.  It is a limited adult view of 
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children’s cognitive abilities.  His critique is that seeing child move through these four developmental 
stages distorts the view of child as a being capable of having his/her own ideas and thoughts.  
Matthews provides evidence with many examples of philosophical conversations with children.  He 
cautions researchers and practitioners by offering an argument against the prescriptive 
conceptualisation of Piaget which prescribes how child develops cognitive thought.  In an attempt to 
expose these distortions, he states that “[W]e must guard against letting….models caricature our 
children and limit the possibilities we are willing to recognize in our dealing with them as fellow human 
beings” (Matthews, 1996a, p. 29).  This exposure of a caricature disrupts notions of developmental 
psychology and suggests that adults have by-passed the conceptual and philosophical ideas that have 
emanated from Piaget’s work, in favour of observations about child development through the 
experiments  Piaget conducted about the observed behaviours of child.  Proponents of developmental 
psychology may disagree, claiming that within these stages, child can still express his/her own ideas. 
Burman (2009) suggests that theories that conceptualise stages of development with specific 
endpoints are problematic as they do not consider economic and political change.  Her main critique is 
that theories of developmental psychology, economic, cultural and historical ideologies, are 
interwoven with dominant ideologies that “reduce and abstract the complexity of children’s lives” 
(Burman, 2009, p. 9). This results in child being viewed through a lens of normativity, and if the child 
does not conform with the endpoints of the developmental theory (idealized norms identified by 
adults), marginalization and pathologising of child are the result.  In a sense, I am beginning to question 
the developmental theories that construct child through an artificial lens, and it is through my 
exposure to the work of Burman, Mathews, Kennedy and Kohan that I argue there is a need to shift 
dominant developmental theories that result in endpoints for children.  Burman, Matthews, Kennedy 
and Kohan remain respectful to the notions of reconceptualising child and deconstructing the 
dominant notions of developmental psychology which filter into most aspects within the school 
context, such as policies, curricula and legislation regarding how child ought to be managed and 
educated in school contexts.  It is through their writing that I have begun to question the need to look 
beyond theories of development. 
 41 
 
P
ag
e4
1
 
 
In their critique of developmental theories of child development, Lipman (1991), Matthews (1996a, 
1996b) and Kennedy (2000) defend child’s ability for rational thought (and philosophising).  Their 
research questions the theory of Jean Piaget, which has dominated theoretical models of childhood.  
Matthews (1996) questions why there should be theories of development in the first place, as these 
models may “dehumanize” child and encourage adults to develop “inappropriate attitudes towards 
child” (Matthews, 1996b, p. 27).  Matthews, (1996b) is particularly critical of the cognitivist conception 
of child posited by Piaget, which conceptualises child as gradually developing through specific stages 
that are dependent on maturation.  He also examines Kohlberg’s theory10 of moral development, 
maintaining that both these theories underestimate child’s capacity for thought.  Lipman (1991) was 
committed to bringing a programme into schools that would build on child’s capacity for thought. This 
will be developed in Chapter four.  
Furthermore, Matthews questions the notion of these developmental theories that argue that a child 
can only reach competency by developing through fixed stages.  He argues that these theories view 
child through a deficit model of development that conceptualises child through intellectual 
inadequacies. It focuses on what children cannot do, and not on what they can do. Matthews’ claims 
that developmental thinking is responsible for the distancing between child and adult. Kennedy 
(2006b, 2008) and Kohan (2008, 2011) would agree with Matthews as they refer to adults’ distancing 
themselves from their own childhood selves in their research.  Matthews’ central argument is that 
dominance of developmental theories of child and childhood has led to adults’ inabilities to examine 
and problematise their own assumptions about “What is child?”  And more importantly, he and other 
critics of developmental psychology stress the need to examine the hidden assumptions in these 
scientific theories of development, still mainly taken for granted in education.  
                                                          
10
 Kohlberg used Piagetian works on moral judgment as a base to inform his own theory of moral development.  He 
proposed a stage theory of moral thinking. He divided this theory into six stages of development based on moral thinking, 
not moral action.  Kohlberg’s theory differed from Piaget in the sense that he defined two stages of development, the 
second beginning at the start of adolescence.  Kohlberg, however, believed that there were additional stages which develop 
well into adolescence and adulthood.  A main critique of Kohlberg’s theory is that it was culturally biased and based on 
Western philosophical thought.  There is also a feminist critique from Gilligan that claims his research was biased towards 
male subjectivity. (Crain,1985) 
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Similarly, Rose (1996) argues that psychology positions child as the object of scientific enquiry.  Thus, 
psychology has constructed or invented a theory of childhood that consists of categorising, measuring 
and managing child according to set standards. Rose’s argument is that childhood is conceptualized as 
a process of development, progressing toward adulthood, and it is through this decisive role that 
theories of development dominate the way in which schools are structured (Rose,1996).  Modern 
schooling is therefore regarded as a context in which to infuse theories of development of child into 
the dominant practices of policy and systems of schooling.  
Mary John’s work on children’s rights11 and power critiques developmental psychology as being related 
to “an epistemological framework”. She describes this as a “cult of the expert emphasizing that 
psychological procedures distance the subject matter under investigation” (John, 2003, p. 187). I 
identify a strong link between John’s “epistemological framework and Fricker’s notion of epistemic 
injustice (as referred to in Chapter 2), in that both theorists claim that the subject (child) is in need of 
investigating and rescuing by the expert knower (adult).  Child is not viewed as a knowing subject; their 
voices are absent from these psychological procedures.  This is not to say that child never has the 
opportunity to express their thoughts and ideas in a psychological intervention, but it suggests that 
voice may be heard by the adult, but not always listened to, in the sense of being taken seriously. 
3.3 The voice of a schooling system: a gap between education and child 
 
Kennedy (2006a, 2006b) and Stables’s (2008) research also links to John’s claim of child as the subject 
matter distanced from adult in developmental theories.  Their work draws on the dilemma of viewing 
child and education as separate entities.  Kennedy prompts us to think about stage theory and its place 
in a schooling system.  He claims this is problematic, arguing that “A stage theory of schooling fits very 
nicely with the practice of modern schooling, which had its origins in a larger project of “discipline” of 
the marginalized- the poor, the insane, and the native- in the interests of social control (Kennedy, 
2006b, p. 117).  Burman (2008; 2009) cautions practitioners that current developmental research, 
which measures development via descriptive structures is fraught, with assumptions.  It is these 
                                                          
11
 The notion of children’s rights will be taken up in more detail in Chapter Five. 
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assumptions that suggest what development look like and which decide who is developed and who is 
not.  In this paradigm of thinking, theories of development are embedded in political structures.  Thus, 
these political interests decide who is more or less developed and places child in relation to adult, or 
one society in relation to another.  In many instances, this is how schools are constructed in terms of 
protecting the political interests of society.  These political ideologies dominate curricula and policy, 
and undermine child as a subject distanced from adult decisions. 
Kennedy (1996) and Kohan (2011) present a plausible case when they claim that there is a ‘gap’ 
between education and child.  Educational systems rely on ideological assumptions and frameworks, 
resting on the assumptions that, because children are not-yet adults, they are viewed as not being 
rational (like adults). As a result, children’s own experiences and preferences are not valued as 
considerations in schooling contexts.  Political and cultural ideologies and assumptions intersect with 
claims made about child’s position in education. This is problematic in terms of where we position child 
in educational contexts as it questions the assumptions we make when categorising child according to 
stages of development.  
Kennedy (2006b) agrees with Matthews on the dominance of Piagetian theory of development in 
education, but he examines this notion through a different lens.  For Matthews (1996b) children are a 
bit like small adults, capable of philosophising, therefore just as capable as adults of thinking 
abstractly12. Matthews argues that developmental psychologists are incorrect in suggesting that 
children’s manner of knowing is inadequate compared to that of adults, and that subsequently, child is 
viewed as not- yet- adult.  Therefore, child is objectified in that there is no acknowledgement of child’s 
capacity to know like adults (e.g. abstractions).   
In contrast, Kennedy (2006b) refers to children as possessing a unique form of knowing.  He claims that 
developmental theories represent an epistemic positioning based on the writings of adult males 
through a Western perspective. Kennedy defines this epistemic orientation in terms of a Cartesian 
binary relationship between subject and object.  Furthermore, he suggests that by viewing conceptions 
of child and childhood together, with factors of influence such as cultural, societal, historical and 
                                                          
12
 This notion of child able to think abstractly will be discussed in Chapter Five 
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biological determinants, a different space is opened up that involves mutual knowledge.  Previously 
this mutual knowledge was limited to dominant groups, and excluded the ‘voices from the margins’, 
such as women, children, and the poor.  He claims these voices have become marginalized and 
silenced, by the dominance of power held by theories of development (Kennedy, 2006b). 
Burman (2008) focuses on the link between development and cultural, psychological, social, and 
economic practices and models.  Burman (2008), Matthews (1996b) and Kennedy (2006a) are all in 
agreement that development practitioners and educationalists are what Burman terms “ill-equipped 
by their theories, and the ways those theories are taken up, to attend to contexts and positions of 
actual children the world over” (Burman, 1998, p. 1).   
Burman (2008) refers to two key claims when discussing the concept of development.  Firstly, she 
suggests different disciplines address the notion of development in different ways.  Her argument 
suggests that because of these differences, there is a strong need to engage with these differences.  
Failure to do so may result in misconceptions, or one group being dominant over another (Burman, 
2008).  Secondly, she suggests that the concept development “as singular not only dangerously 
simplifies the diversity of possible and available forms but thereby contributes to their marginalization, 
devaluation and even exploitation or oppression” (Burman, 2008, p. 6).  The first claim has implications 
as different lenses are cast on different conceptions of development depending on “others”, such as 
historical, political and cultural dimensions.  The latter claim suggests there are methodological and 
practical consequences in terms of examining possibilities for change (Burman, 2008). 
Examining the concept development more closely, it is important to understand what development 
means. The concept development reveals a number of definitions; from a developmental psychology 
stance it may mean ‘normal’ or ‘within acceptable limits’.  On the other hand, development may mean 
contested beliefs about what is right for the child, or, as I will argue throughout this research, the 
importance of my considering and acknowledging child’s voice.  Furthermore, development goes hand 
in hand with cultural beliefs that have been passed down through generations, and thus development 
will have different meanings to different cultures. 
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Moreover, Burman (2008) suggests that the status of developmental psychology is not clear.  This will 
be further developed when the notion of hearing child’s voice will be addressed (which has often been 
devalued, marginalised and exploited) in terms of rights and inclusion of voice13 in school contexts.  
If beliefs about children and childhood are seen through a Western societal perspective then it is clear 
that these ideas remain contested and elicit debate amongst researchers today.  Some ideas that have 
shaped beliefs as to how we conceptualise child can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1699) 
who believed that children’s development was shaped by their socialisation within that society, so that 
they would learn their rightful place.  John Locke (1632-1704) argued that development was critical to 
lay down foundations for child to reach his/her potential as he claimed that we are all born as a ‘tabula 
rasa’ or blank slate. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) believed that in order for a child to develop 
his/her natural innocence needed to be protected, and in doing so, child should be afforded the 
freedom to play, learn and mature. The philosopher Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) claimed that 
development was an interaction between child’s potential and experience, nature verses nurture.  It is 
through these beliefs about young children that fundamental questions are still being raised about 
child and childhood and have shaped policy and practice in school contexts. 
3.4 A Post-Piagetian Era 
Researchers in a post-Piagetian era suggest that there is a need to deconstruct developmental 
psychology.  This shift in thinking has brought about a change in the way in which cognitive 
development of children which previously existed has been viewed. Gopnik (1996, p. 221) advocates a 
“kind of developmental pluralism”. Her argument suggests that new theories spring from old ones.  
This shifting of ideas has led to many theorists questioning ‘developmentalism’ and a rejection or 
revision of existing ones.   
The continual shifting of, and development of new theories or ideas, according to Gopnik (1996, p. 
221) are “representations of the world that have distinctive features, and they include rules that allow 
the generation of new representations”. In view of this, there has been a greater awareness of the fact 
                                                          
13
 This will be developed in Chapter 5 
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that there is a strong need to view child through a different lens, where child is viewed as competent, 
rather than abstracted from educational contexts. 
What perpetuates this abstraction is that schools are organised according to these so-called age-
related stages, which are assumed to be valid. However, child cannot or should not be viewed as an 
object of category, who is moved from grade to grade.   If so, children are viewed as vulnerable, 
needing adult direction and protection; they are often regarded as what John (2003, p. 19) refers to as 
“people in the making” rather than “people of power“.   
Developmental psychology has been central in shaping policies about child and defining how we 
conceptualize child. Burman’s claim is that we need “to deconstruct developmental psychology, and to 
identify and evaluate the guiding themes or discourses that structure its current dominant forms” 
(Burman, 2008 p. 1). Burman describes the term ‘deconstruction’ as ‘in the sense of laying bare” and 
suggests that we need to “look beyond current frameworks, within which developmental psychological 
investigation is formulated.  There is a call to take up broader questions of where these themes fit into 
the social practices in which psychology functions” (Burman, 2008, p.1).    
This notion of developmental norms, whereby child is pathologised and categorised, according to 
developmental norms, has informed my own practice.  This reflects a model of practice that 
marginalizes and excludes child because of a deficit.  The deficit within the child is the central focus for 
separating him or her from others who are ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’.  Bradley, in ( John, 2003) suggests 
that few psychologists are active in the field of children’s rights and it is this issue that has impacted on 
child not being given voice, as child’s experiences of the world have not been addressed or recognised.  
Bradley’s argument suggests that developmental psychology, as it is being taught in teacher training 
institutions, is failing to open researchers’ and practitioners’ eyes to more global and important issues 
such as poverty, violence and war that underpin how we deal with child and conceptualise child.   
Philosophers would argue that psychology is “grounded in procedures that distance the knower from 
the subject matter under investigation” (John, 2003, p. 59).  It is this distance between the psychologist 
and the subject (child) that has raised critique from advocates of children’s rights and feminist 
psychologists. They argue that child’s experiences are ignored in developmental psychology, due to the 
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positioning of the psychologist as expert and child as object.  This power relationship has resulted in 
child being overly assessed and categorised according to the expertise of adult.  John (2003) suggests 
“children’s experiences have to be valued “as if”’ they mattered (John, 2003, p. 61).  These feminist 
writers (John and Burman) suggest that our current view of developmental psychology is fraught with 
adult domination of child neglecting the view that child has power and rights, as they are regarded as 
not-yet-adults.   
These perspectives advocate that child has not been heard in terms of life experiences, such as their 
position in society, where they are oppressed and sometimes victims of violence or abuse.  This leads 
adult to question the difficulties faced when we are dealing with child, it is politically and morally naïve 
to assume that this is not problematic, as society constructs child as not-yet-adult.  A deepening of 
questioning of our assumptions is needed to ascertain how seriously we value child’s experiences and 
accept them as meaningful.   
The scope of this research is too limited to elaborate on the notion of societal statuses with regard to 
marginalised groups (women and children).However, where relevant issues are raised regarding the 
status of women and child and the distinction between adult-child, they will be incorporated into my 
argument.  Historically, the voices of woman and child have been marginalised in many societal 
contexts. 
It is particularly for this reason that Burman’s (1998, 2008, 2009) work is relevant as she claims that 
psychologists’ views of childhood are incomplete.  She argues that even though there is a wealth of 
literature written from a psychological perspective on child development, her work suggests that 
developmental psychology models are contestable, and these contestations have led her to comment 
on the limitations of developmental psychological models and practices in terms of economic 
development policies.  
The notion that the different discourses of childhood are fundamental to how adults perceive child in 
relation to adult form part of social and cultural narratives that position our identity; what makes a 
child a child, and an adult an adult.  Developmental psychology positions the way in which we define 
child and informs social policy and practice. From this, I have attempted to draw the threads of 
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conceptions of childhood and ascertain the impact these have on the decisions adults make through a 
lens of developmental psychology.  This argument will be taken up later in this research report, when 
discussing the work of Mary John. She claims that it is not only within the domain of developmental 
psychology that childhood has been misunderstood, but also in a broader sense, in the way in which 
society and institutions have interpreted, formulated, and implemented children’s rights. 
Burman (2008 p.69) argues that nuanced meanings of child from ‘nostalgic romanticism and 
naturalization’  emphasize how adults learn about developmental psychology as dominant models of 
child, where development is observed as natural and inescapable.  She draws on the notion that we 
also view child through our memories of our own childhood, which we find reconstructed in 
developmental psychology norms.  By completely deconstructing the nature of developmental 
theories, Burman claims that society will conceptualise child and childhood in less restricted ways.  
3.5 A changing view of childhood  
 
This links to the work of the sociologist, Jens Qvortrup, who highlights “the conceptual homelessness 
of childhood” (Qvortrup, 2007, p. 395) and argued that structures in society (class, gender, race) were 
“all reserved for adults” (Qvortrup, 2007). 
Furthermore, Qvortrup stresses that childhood forms part of the permanent structure of society, yet 
childhood constantly shifts and changes.  His work (much like Burman’s), explores how children’s 
contributions to societies has changed, and argues that childhood has become institutionalised.  This 
raises questions as to the impact of global policy shifts, which suggest that there is a danger that 
because childhood has been universalised and dominated by schooling, there is no conceptual space 
left for any other activities of childhood. 
In sum, until quite recently, developmental psychology has tended to focus on compartmentalising 
child into ages and stages, rather than focusing on what it means for child to have a voice.  
Furthermore, age may not equate with a child’s psycho-social, moral or cognitive development.  
Therefore, justifying child’s participation in decision-making according to chronological age is a too 
narrow view.  Developmental stages, from a deficit model point of view, provide a general idea of 
 49 
 
P
ag
e4
9
 
 
child’s cognitive capabilities; however, they do not consider other factors  that may hamper or 
otherwise influence a child’s contribution to educational processes such as experience, capabilities, 
family circumstances, cultural differences, and education, to name a few.   
Developmentalism does not take into account a more contemporary shift in developmental psychology 
which looks at a child through an ecosystemic or systems model14 that would take such socio-
economic, ethnic and cultural factors into account.  Individual children may differ radically from other 
children of the same age and ‘stage of development’.  A strong argument is that children are generally 
capable of giving voice to matters that affect them, and of making choices. Judgments about 
‘appropriateness’ or ‘normality’ are profoundly influenced by the conceptions of child and childhood 
that shape how adult interprets his or her educational encounters with child.  The ecosystemic or 
systems model of child development is not without its critics. I do not suggest that following this 
approach is the only authentic way to include child’s voice.  I believe that by working systematically, 
and viewing child through the various systems that influence their lives brings adult a step closer to 
understanding what it means to be child, and allows us to question our existence within the contexts 
of who we are and how we respond to life experiences. This model views child as part of a system that 
shapes the essence of being, rather than as an isolated individual.  In thinking more systematically, we 
are able to examine the assumptions underlying relationships and the dynamics that may have not 
been explicit. 
Adult’s perceptions and decisions about capability have dominated views about participation.  A child 
not following the characteristics that are supposedly typical or normal for their stage and age, may be 
viewed as different or labelled as portraying ‘abnormal’, ‘inappropriate’ or ‘inadequate’ behaviour.  
Child is thus viewed as incomplete and deficient, as compared with adults’ conceptualisation of ‘other’, 
which is separate from adult.   In educational contexts children are traditionally viewed as belonging to 
their parents and in need of protection and therefore decisions are made for them, rather than by 
                                                          
14
 For further reading, refer to Bronfenbrenner’s Ecsosytemic Theory, based on Child Development according to a nested 
systems theory, which proposes that child develops within a social context and develops according to the various systems 
that are interdependent on one another, thus impacting on development. (Donald, Lazarus, Lolwana, 2010) 
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them.  I will return to this idea of childhood as a state of incapacity in the context of human rights.  The 
question of whether child can or cannot be afforded rights is explored in Chapter Six. 
Developmental psychology has had a powerful influence on policies and curricula, and still dominates 
the ways in which child is conceptualised and how child is positioned in school contexts. Theories of 
development based on sequenced stages have played an important role in the way in which 
pedagogies are used in education.  However, there has been a call by various researchers such as 
Burman, John, Kennedy, and Matthews to consider alternate ways of viewing child and more 
importantly considering ways in which to deconstruct developmental norms that have shaped 
educational practices for many decades.  Their main argument is that there is a need to look for 
alternative ways in which to theorise school curricula and draw up policies that acknowledge child as a 
knower rather than an incompetent receiver of adult ideas.   
 
There is a strong call in current literature on philosophy of childhood and child development theories 
to examine and shift paradigms of theories of childhood in order to include child in the educational 
context.  For example, Cook and Cook (2009, p. 3) argue that although hierarchical models of 
development can be useful in that they “enable psychologists and educators to assess rational forms of 
thought”; they also make their concern explicit.  It is therefore necessary to examine these 
assumptions that construct child in an artificial, scientific manner and move beyond the Cartesian 
dualisms.  
 
It is these developmental models that separate and restrain movement between boundaries of adult 
and child and which do not allow for common perceptions or sharing of experiences between adult 
and child. This argument mirrors Jenks’s (2010) observation that adult and childhood have become 
‘locked’. Child is perceived as a being he/she possesses invalid knowledge, and only adult is the 
knower. Thus these models create a notion that limits the validation of child’s capabilities and assumes 
that child cannot be a knower.  Moreover, these models assume that because adult is the knower, 
adult possesses an ability to know.  Cook and Cook (2009) caution that the adult-child dichotomy is 
complex and that the relationship should not be over-simplified. They argue that if there is an 
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oversimplification of this dichotomy, both adult and child will lose out.  There is a place for universal 
stage theories in educational contexts, if adult and child relationships are reconstructed within this 
dichotomy so that there is “co-identity formation” between adult and child.  This ‘co-identity’ may shift 
adult’s dominant role over child and allow for child’s voice to be heard and included.   Cook and Cook 
(2009) offer a compromise in that there is a need to be aware of this adult-child dichotomy. This 
mirrors what Kennedy (2006) proposes when he problematizes the notion that childhood is not to be 
viewed through an epistemological lens only.  Therefore, adult cannot over-simplify and become stuck 
in defining child according to rigid scientific criteria.  His argument is that if the relationship between 
adult and child becomes an oversimplification, then adult will remain in a fixed state as the ‘direct 
knower’ who no longer believes that it is important to question assumptions and enquire beyond the 
epistemological norms that may, in fact, oversimplify the complexity of this dichotomy. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to address the complexities involved in problematising different concepts 
and conceptions of child and childhood through the lens of developmental psychology, which has 
dominated theories of childhood for decades. I have argued that there has been an increased and 
growing awareness that there is a need to reconceptualise how child and childhood is defined. This has 
been done through the work of various writers such as Jenks and Qvortop from a sociological 
perspective, and Kennedy, Kohan and Matthews from a philosophical perspective. These writers have 
suggested that there are other ways of viewing child and that developmental psychology often 
abstracts and objectifies child as a subject, rather than a person with competencies and capabilities. I 
have argued that the writings of Burman and John suggest that there is concern that developmental 
models of childhood need to be deconstructed, as they are fraught with adult domination of child.   
This chapter has highlighted the need to move beyond developmentalism and has explored the 
complexities between the dichotomy of adult and child.  These ideas will continue to be integrated in 
the chapters that follow.  
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Chapter Four  
Philosopher’s Child 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Contemporary philosophers have brought new perspectives (inspired by contemporary Western 
philosophical thought) to discussions about childhood, to reinforce the relevance of philosophy and its 
foundations in schooling contexts. There is a developing conceptual framework of ideas in recent work 
on the notions of childhood that critiques discourses that have dominated schooling over the 
centuries. Current notions in the study of philosophy of childhood, have posited a strong call to 
reconceptualise the meaning of childhood (Archard, 2010; Kennedy, 2000, 2006a, 2006b; Murris & 
Haynes, 2011; Stables 2008).  
Recent criticisms from the domain of philosophy and proponents of critical thinking programmes have 
challenged the assumptions that the main purpose of education is to impart knowledge.  In many 
instances, research on educational systems has centred on this transmission of knowledge model as 
the main focus to assess child learning.   Philosophers of education have been urging educational 
reform and have explicitly rejected ideas that the main purpose of education is to impart knowledge.  
A central figure in this movement, Matthew Lipman, argued that children have capabilities of 
reasoning and that the teaching of critical thinking is not to be regarded in an incidental manner, or as 
an add-on to the curriculum.   His argument reflects his strong beliefs that educational systems have 
failed to encourage critical thinking amongst children as well as adults.  Out of his strong desire to 
promote critical thinking in the classroom, Lipman developed a program entitled Philosophy for 
Children (P4C), with the expectation that it would make educationalists, researchers and practitioners 
think more deeply about the way in which schools serve educational goals.     
 Lipman also challenged the various claims made by developmental psychology, which still dominates 
the goals of schooling, and has argued that the appropriate vehicle for teaching thinking in the 
classroom is philosophy.  More importantly, he viewed philosophy taught in the classrooms as 
something that is done through dialogue, rather than taught though transmission models of teaching.  
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Significantly, he did not advocate that children should be taught philosophy, but rather be given 
opportunities to practise rigorous thinking through philosophising in a supportive, democratic and 
reflexive environment.  In view of the fact that Lipman not only challenged preconceptions about 
child/adult relationships, what children are capable off intellectually and emotionally, as well as 
offering a practical educational alternative to include child’s voice, I will focus part of this chapter on 
the programme and the related ideas that he developed. 
 Lipman’s ideas led to the development of his P4C programme, and its theories and practices have 
been taken up globally by many schools and teacher training institutions since the 1970’s.  This 
programme opened doors to a shift in thinking about how child is viewed in the classroom, and how 
conceptions of child have changed over decades.  I will argue that child’s voice is a critical component 
within P4C, and discuss the more recent research by various post-modernist writers, who have been 
referred to by Vansieleghem and Kennedy (2011, p. 268) as ‘second-generation’ P4C practitioners15. 
Philosophical thinking with children poses a challenge for Piagetian thinking in that conceptions of how 
we view child are problematized through its practise (as well as its theory), and this will be explored 
further below. 
4.2 Philosophy of Childhood 
 
Philosophy of Childhood, as a new branch within the field of philosophy, has become a topic of debate 
and discussion in recent years.  There is a growing body of literature that has questioned theories 
which have defined child according to certain limiting moral, ethical and cultural views.  As argued in 
the previous chapter, Kennedy (2000) and Matthews (1996b) argue that developmental psychology as 
the dominant discourse has shaped and seriously limited the way in which institutions have viewed 
child and child’s position in family, school and society in general.   These philosophers foreground a 
number of central concerns as to how conceptions of child are viewed by modern society and the 
ideologies embedded in different conceptions of childhood. 
                                                          
15
 Although generalisations are fraught with complexities as not all “second-generation” P4C proponents are committed to 
a radical reconceptualization of child and childhood. Thus for the purpose of this research project I will only focus on only  
those who do.   
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As a starting point, I will touch on the writings of Aristotle and Plato to suggest how child is referred to 
in ancient writings, although this will be limited by the scope of this research report. Aries, as referred 
to in Chapter Two, argued that medieval civilisation had forgotten the classical aims of education as 
posited in the writings of ancient paideia16. He claimed that there was a distinction between the worlds 
of child and adult.  Formal education was conceptualised around the idea that it was necessary for 
child to receive an education in order to move into the world of the adult.     
In Ancient Greece, the writings of Plato (427-437 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) concerned themselves 
with the problems of education, looking at it through the lenses of educational philosophy and 
pedagogy.  These two perspectives, educational philosophy and pedagogy, are closely interwoven. This 
argument will be developed later, specifically with reference to Kennedy’s, Stables’s and Kohan’s 
claims that modern schooling has ignored the importance of embedding pedagogy in educational aims 
and objectives.  Aristotle built upon Plato’s ideas and central in both their writings is the suggestion 
that educational philosophy and pedagogy are intertwined, with a distinct role for philosophy itself in 
pedagogical constructs.  Plato, for example, advocated that the goal of the State was to bring up 
children to be adults who would be capable of living virtuous lives.  It is important to acknowledge, 
that many references to children in ancient writings are not specific.  The Greeks did not have a word 
for child; the word pias indicated boys who were under 17 or 18 years old or girls that were not yet 
married (Postman, 1994).   
Kennedy, (2006a) proposes that adults construct the world for children and schooling, and proposes 
that school is the important area where adult and child meet.  He discusses childhood in the Romantic 
era as dominated by adult and, more importantly, refers to the dreary institutionalised model of 
schooling as an “utter travesty” (Kennedy, 2006a, p.40).  He further suggests that schooling and the 
treatment of child in that era could be construed as “a calculated act of social construction” (Kennedy, 
2006, p. 41).  Like others, his argument is that Rousseau paved the way forward in changing the vision 
of how adult-child relationships are conceptualised.  His Romantic reconstruction of how the 
                                                          
16
 The ancient Greek word meaning ‘child-rearing education’.  It aimed at producing a higher type of man.  Paideia meant 
the process of educating man into his true form, the real and genuine human nature (from: Naugle, 2002). 
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relationship between adult-child should be considered radically altered adults’ way of thinking about 
child and childhood in the early 20th century.   
Philosopher John Dewey proposed that schooling must be reconstructed in order to value child as a 
contributor to educational processes.  Dewey’s book Human Nature and Conduct was critical of the 
education of his time (1930’s), which  he called ‘training’, rather than ‘education’, where “plasticity is 
warped and docility is taken to mean advantage of…to learn just those special things which those 
having the power and authority wish to teach” (Dewey,1930, p211).  Dewey advocated that viewing 
educators as masters of authority was wrong.  He claimed that educators should view child as a “being 
with which to share views” and who is able to make free suggestions regarding his/her learning.  He 
did not mean that children should be left to their own devices, but that true intellectual shaping 
involved the relationship between adult and child through a process of “social intelligence” (Dewey, 
1930, p. 212). Nevertheless, these changes were superficial or largely ignored (Kennedy, 2006b).   
4.3 The Voice of Child in Philosophy for Children (P4C) 
 
The possibility that children are able to philosophise has gained wide interest in the domain of 
philosophy of education and philosophy of childhood. Matthews (1996b) argues that being able to 
philosophise is natural to all human beings. In fact, child, according to Matthews, can do this better 
than adults, whom he claims have internalised the “requirement for knowing” (Matthews, 1996b, 
p.28). Matthews does caution readers of his work that children cannot be compared to any adult and 
that children may not be as disciplined, or not as rigorous, as adults, in terms of philosophising 
(Matthews, 1996b, p. 17). He suggests that adult has lost his or her philosophical sensitivity, by 
claiming that child is the epitome of a philosopher, as child is able to ‘detach’ and ask questions that 
are complex in nature. Similarly, Murris, (2000, p. 263) claims that young children raise questions that 
“academic philosophers are often puzzled about, when they have just started doing philosophy”. 
Murris (2000) raises questions about comparing a child’s ability to do philosophy with that of adults, 
and alerts one to be careful of which adults are being referred to.   Adults may take the meaning of 
the language that children use for granted, or may interpret the opinions and ideas children voice 
inaccurately and on their own terms.  
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Lipman (1991) acknowledges that rethinking educational change is not an easy task.  His supposition is 
that there are obstacles present in the form of how schools see the nature of thinking, and disparities 
about psychological issues and the role that philosophy should play in schools.  He argues that 
dominant assumptions as to how schooling is metered out tend to view thinking skills as separate 
courses to be transmitted in a decontextualized or isolated manner.  In contrast, his suggestion is that 
thinking skills should also form part of an infusion into traditional subject courses, although it is 
recommended to include separate philosophy lessons as well.  He illustrates this by contrasting what 
he claims is “the standard paradigm or normal practice and the reflective paradigm of critical 
practice” 17(Lipman, 1991, p. 13) against the current educational contexts.  Lipman’s claim was that a 
reflective paradigm to education would shift the way in which educators viewed child in a classroom 
context, through a guided ‘community of enquiry’18.  The role of the teacher is seen as enquirer and 
facilitator, not one of authority. Although the teacher is in control of procedural matter, the content 
of lessons is partly shaped by children’s own interests and experiences. In this paradigm, child is not 
abstracted in the process, but rather has an important role to play in constructing new knowledge 
within the classroom context.   Child is viewed as a thoughtful, reflective and reasonable person, who 
has a voice.  The standard paradigm, in contrast, raises an assumption that knowledge is fixed and a 
product to be transmitted by educators, who hold the power and authority on what counts as 
important knowledge. 
Kennedy (2006a, 2006b) and Matthews (1996b) argue that Piaget failed to recognise the philosophical 
dimension of young children’s thinking.  In his dialogues with young children, Matthews observed that 
child’s thinking and reasoning is philosophically sophisticated, and his work highlights the importance 
of inviting children to reflect on their own experiences philosophically.  A strong critique by 
philosophers of childhood is that developmental psychology has underestimated the significance of 
                                                          
17
 For further reading on Lipman’s characterisation of each paradigm and its dominant assumptions, see Lipman, M (1991) 
Thinking in Education. New York: Cambridge Press 
18
 Community of Enquiry was developed by Matthew Lipman based on the scientific model of Pierce. Lipman (1991, p. 20) 
for further reading refer to Lipman Thinking in Education. Children participate in a ‘community of enquiry’, which may be 
defined as a reflective approach to classroom discussion built up over time with a single group of learners. In a community 
of enquiry children vote for a question to be used for discussion and within the dialogical process where they sit in a circle 
facilitated by the educator, they learn to build upon one another’s ideas and give reasons for their responses. The 
‘community’ embodies co-operation, care, respect and safety; the ‘enquiry’ reaches for understanding, meaning, truth and 
values supported by reasons. (Williams, 2011) www.thinkingscripts.co.uk 
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listening to child’s voice.  This coincides with current literature on child’s voice regarding Children’s 
Rights which will be addressed in Chapters Five and Six. 
Adults’ conceptions of child colour the evaluation of child’s capabilities.  Matthews (1996b) argues that 
not only developmental psychologists, but also adult philosophers reinforce the idea that philosophy is 
rooted in the knowledge that adults pass onto children, rather than focussing on the natural curiosity 
children possess and express in philosophical enquiry.  Matthews (1996b) believes that adults’ view of 
child as not being philosophical is due to the fact that philosophy has disappeared from the adult 
world. This is the reason many educators and educationalists believe that children are not capable of 
philosophical thought or higher-level engagement with concepts that are abstract.   
Like Matthews, Lipman believed that “children are naturally disposed to acquire cognitive skills, just as 
they naturally acquire language” (Lipman, 1991, p. 40). His life’s work was devoted to the notion that 
education systems can be established that nurture a child’s capacity to think better, and his radical 
proposal was his claim that the only way in which to build on this natural capacity was through 
philosophy “when properly reconstructed and properly taught” (Lipman, 1991, p. 3).   
Lipman (1991) is not suggesting that education should not be without some form of knowledge 
content, however, he believed that the best way of accessing this content was through a proper 
induction in the thinking characteristic of the various disciplines (rather than rote learning).   He 
believed that if a child could think well, then he/she could access the content that is needed in various 
contexts.  His suggestion was to build on a capacity for reasonableness and his vision was to see 
democratic education as “a context in which young people learn to be reasonable” (Lipman, 1991, p. 
16).  It should prepare people to “live as inquiring members of an inquiring society” (Lipman, 1991, p. 
246). Many have critiqued this assumption, namely academic philosophers, who see no place for child 
in any philosophy programme especially in a school context. Eccelestone & Hayes, (in Bramall 2009; 
Gregory, 2009; Haynes; 2009; Murris, 2009; Williams, 2009); Flay (in Murris 2000). 
Lipman introduced his programme in the 1970’s and established with colleagues the Institute for 
Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State College - now Montclair State 
University.  IAPC’s role was to develop materials and educators’ guides for doing philosophy with 
 58 
 
P
ag
e5
8
 
 
children in schools and colleges in the US, and to run international educational training programmes.  
P4C advocates such as Laurence Splitter and Ann Sharp (1995) suggest that even though educators 
may not have been exposed to philosophy, they may have a natural aptitude to philosophise with 
others.  It was through this vision that philosophy for children was initially introduced into middle 
schools in the US.   In developing materials for educators, the program was thus introduced into 
schools. In 1985, upon reflecting on the international growth of the P4C program, the International 
Council for Philosophical Inquiry (ICPIC) was established to continue the momentum of the program 
and further its ideals through international conferences and a journal entitled Thinking: The Journal for 
Philosophy for Children. 
However, many critics of the pedagogy, Philosophy for Children19 suggest that the place for the study 
of philosophy is in higher institutions.  One of the central questions shaping this debate is whether 
Philosophy for Children is ‘real’ philosophy. For example, White (1996) argues that P4C cannot be 
philosophy because it is too abstract for children.  His argument critiques the idea that children can do 
second-order thinking, and his claim is that real philosophy requires the thinker to “reflect on the 
interrelations between concepts and allied ideas, against the background of larger frameworks of 
ideas” (White, 1996, p. 75). Children, so the argument goes, miss this larger framework and can only 
think about the concrete use of concepts.  
In contrast, Murris (2000) and Sutcliffe (2011) argue that academic philosophers do not understand 
philosophy as a process, nor the importance of pedagogy, which is underpinned in any P4C 
programme.  This raises the argument that P4C and traditional academic philosophy are at odds with 
one another. P4C is not only a critique of current education, but also of the way philosophy is currently 
taught in higher education institutions and secondary schools. Hence, the question “What is 
philosophy?” needs to be reframed as “What ought philosophy to be?”  This challenges the 
                                                          
19
 This program was started in the United States in the 1970s, by Matthew Lipman who published a novel for secondary 
school children entitled Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery which encouraged children to develop philosophical thinking.  The 
central feature of this pedagogy is to use a Community of Enquiry, facilitated by the teacher, using various stimuli such as 
pictures,and picturebooks.  Karin Murris and Joanna Haynes developed this pedagogy further by suggesting that instead of 
following Lipman’s approach of using prescribed pre-written materials, enquiries could be developed by using picturebooks.  
Practitioners such as Roger Sutcliffe use news stories and Steve Williams posit the importance of dialogue to raise 
philosophical issues using this pedagogy. (www.plato.Stanford.edu ) 
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assumptions of academic philosophers and suggests that philosophy is not fixed, and its place is not 
only in a university context. 
Both P4C and academic philosophy are built on assumptions that philosophy encourages students to 
think critically and engage in enquiries that foster reflective thought.  Both require a form of a 
community wherein philosophical concepts can be discussed and justified through reasoning.  
However, there is much controversial debate that suggests that the two can be afforded the same 
status, in their different takes as to how they define philosophy. 
These critiques of P4C are often forged by philosophers who have had no training in the P4C 
programme or little exposure to working with children in communities of enquiry. Critics that have 
argued against the P4C programme have termed it “unintellectual” (Eccelestone & Hayes, 2009), 
“unsocratic” (Smith, 2011), “undialogical” (Vansieleghem, 2006), and “imperialistic “(Biesta, 2011). 
Many of these critics have an academic philosophy background, thus their critiques are often centred 
in a hegemonic domain where little engagement with the actual practice of P4C and its research 
findings have been considered. 
Proponents of P4C (Bramall 2009; Gregory, 2009; Haynes; 2009; Murris, 2009; Williams, 2009) 
responded to some of these critics at a symposium. The main goal of this symposium was to engage 
with the critics of P4C and suggest ways in which it could play a role in Higher Education.  The 
objections raised by the proponents of P4C were that all the critics had dismissed P4C as if it had “one 
identity” (Bramall 2009; Gregory, 2009; Haynes; 2009; Murris, 2009; Williams, 2009, p. 3).  The 
respondents suggested that the critics had failed to engage with the theoretical underpinnings of P4C 
and had obtained data for their critique mainly from websites, rather than focusing on the vast 
research literature on the subject.  Another criticism by the respondents was the fact that the works of 
Matthews (1996) theories of child’s competency in thinking abstractly, and Lipman’s (1991) vision and 
theories of the P4C programme, had not been studied or included. 
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A second generation20 of proponents of P4C has emerged out of the foundations of the work done by 
Matthew Lipman. These proponents take a critical distance of the P4C programme, though broadly 
speaking they share Lipman’s similar educational values, new orientations have emerged as a result of 
re-examining the historical and epistemological foundations of P4C.  For example, Murris (2008) 
suggests that as P4C has extended into different school contexts in different countries, it has 
encountered new challenges.  She claims that individuals bring their own identities and philosophies 
into P4C.  Vansieleghem and Kennedy claim that this second generation P4C is “internally diverse but 
unified by a two-fold ideal: (i) a quietened emphasis on logic and reasoning and (ii) an amplified 
emphasis on reflection and dialogue” (Vansieleghem and Kennedy, 2011, p. 177). Children participating 
in a community of enquiry are therefore encouraged to set out standards or rules as a community and 
discuss and reflect on concepts that are meaningful to them.   
In the 1990’s the Society for Advancing Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education (SAPERE) was 
founded in the UK by Roger Sutcliffe, Karin Murris and Chris Rowley.  SAPERE replaced Lipman’s 
suggested curriculum, which contained written dialogues and extended educator’s manuals by 
suggesting that a wider variety of strategies could be included to do philosophy in schools.  The new 
changes allowed the proponents of second-generation P4C to look at methodologies and stimuli for 
lessons that promoted reflection and dialogue.  SAPERE’s vision mirrors Murris’ notion that each 
individual has their own identity and philosophy.  Second-generation P4C practitioners have thus 
promoted the use of a variety of different methods.  Changes have taken on different ideas.  Murris 
(1992) pioneered the use of picture books as stimuli to develop philosophical reasoning. Fisher (1996) 
advocated using poetry and narratives and Liptai (2005) has worked extensively with art and music (in 
SAPERE, 2006, p. 1). This capacity for change has brought new identities, positioning and expanded 
opportunities for practitioners wanting to implement philosophy with children in their schools.   
                                                          
20
 There is a second generation of P4C advocates within the discourse of philosophy for children.  These advocates 
(Margaret Sharp, David Kennedy, Karin Murris, Joanna Haynes, Walter Kohan and others) have created new thinking and 
ideas around P4C.  The new ideas that have been conceptualized are not seen as an attack on the predecessors of the 
programme developed by Lipman, but they are rather viewed as a move towards a changing global environment in 
education.  For further reading see Vansieleghem & Kennedy (2011)  
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Where does P4C position itself in a post-Lipman era?  Murris and Haynes (2011) acknowledge the 
pioneering work of Lipman and the P4C program that has gained momentum internationally over the 
last few decades, but suggest that working with prewritten material and questions as used by Lipman is 
too prescriptive. The process of facilitating P4C programmes, as they stand traditionally, is too directive 
and is more like a discussion between teacher and child than a mutual reflection of ideas.  They 
strongly advocate that P4C ‘rolled out in this way’, and is at odds with the ethos of a community of 
enquiry, which should express democratic notions of sharing and building on each other’s’ ideas.   
Furthermore, Murris and Haynes (2011) suggest that the incorporation of P4C in schooling contexts 
should be seen as an integral part of the curriculum, rather than as a non-systematically integrated 
add-on. In my own experience of being exposed to a P4C programme through the Masters Course I 
took, I was able to see the links between the theories behind bringing P4C into a curriculum.  I was also 
able to begin to work with children in my practice using picturebooks and I realised despite their age, 
eight year olds were able to ask insightful questions and discuss abstract ideas such as love, hate, fear 
and forgiveness amongst others, through building on each other’s ideas and justifying their reasons 
through dialogue with one another. I agree with the claim by Murris and Haynes (2011) that “P4C puts 
philosophy of education, firmly on the agenda of all educators, not just teachers of philosophy” (Murris 
& Haynes, 2011, p. 60). In this regard, educators’ understandings of the nature and role of philosophy 
and the important role it can play in educational contexts needs, to be cultivated.  Therefore, 
philosophising with child challenges educators to hear child in a unique way. Suddenly, power is 
shifted; adult is not the dominant player in the process and through a thorough knowledge of the 
philosophy behind the P4C programme and proper training, these challenges are exposed.  Adult in a 
sense is challenged by this loss of control as there is a focus on child’s questions and responses and the 
session is not teacher-directed; the children map the concepts to be discussed during the lesson, and 
with careful facilitation by the teacher, the dialogue is developed to incorporate multiple voices rather 
than one dominant teacher’s voice.  The voices heard are the children’s more than the teacher’s.  The 
danger here is that P4C taught by untrained practitioners may “introduce a philosophy program such 
as the P4C program in an uncritical way” (Murris & Haynes, 2011, p. 60).  The core of a P4C programme 
thus lies in the construction of a dialogical encounter between adult (educator) and child.  Educators 
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(adult) ought to appreciate that childhood is a valuable phase of life and philosophising with child 
enables adult/child to consider issues based on their own experiences.  The danger is if the educator 
(adult) does not consider child’s view and does not engage critically with this transformation of 
creating dialogue between adult and child, child is not acknowledged as being competent to 
philosophise. 
As explained before, Matthews develops the argument that children are capable of philosophical 
thought, a fact underestimated by educators and educationalists. He claims that educational systems 
prioritise ‘ordinary’ questions that are of the empirical, factual kind, over and above complex 
questions- abstract questions that sometimes can result in perplexity and uncomfortable situations for 
the adult. For example, schools are structured to work along conceptual frameworks where 
standardisation of assessment and curricula are used as a measure of whether a child is competent or 
not to be promoted to the next level or grade.  
These two contrasting views, that child is viewed as competent and capable of philosophical thought, 
or that child is  seen through a stage-theory that measures competence through maturation, give rise 
to what Kennedy & Vansieleghem’s (2011) call ‘cracks in the concept’. They claim that a concept should 
emerge and develop through experience and reflection.  It is through these experiences that we 
encounter, that the concepts we hold both transform and are transformed.  Furthermore, concepts are 
shaped by beliefs and ones that have ethical implications as to “how self and the world should work” 
(Kennedy and Vansieleghem, 2011, p. 272). Thus, concepts have a potential opening or ‘crack’ in them.  
These ‘cracks in the concept’ create a contradiction which forces one to problematize these ‘cracks’ 
and raise questions. 
Viewing the concept child through the different lenses of developmental psychology and philosophy of 
child, questions the contradictions that arise.  Developmental psychology reinforces child as a non-
participant in society and schooling contexts, creating a ‘crack’ between the normative view of child 
and the view of child through a P4C lens, which sees child as a competent thinker.  These ‘cracks’ in the 
conceptions of child force educators and educationalists to examine assumptions and contradictions 
they hold about child’s capabilities. The P4C programme advocates the oral nature of a dialogical 
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approach. Child is viewed as competent. I agree that there is a need for child to be given a voice to 
construct and deconstruct meanings, ask questions and engage critically with the world.  However, I 
am also mindful of the complexities involved with dealing with these ‘cracks’ that question how we as 
adults view and treat children.  It is no easy task, considering all the levels that underlie a notion of 
viewing child as competent.  It is not only in a school context that ‘cracks’ become evident; they are 
inherent at all levels of society (socio-economic, political, moral and cultural). 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In sum, P4C, since its inception in the 1970’s, has not been left out of academic debate.  It is through 
rigorous academic debate and sustained practises that Lipman’s pioneering work (which stressed the 
need for and abilities of young children to reason together using their experiences) has evolved into 
the diverse practices of the second-generation P4C proponents, with an emphasis on dialogue and 
reflection. It is, in particular, this notion of dialogue and reflection that I argue has advantages for 
child’s voice to be included in educational contexts. 
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Chapter Five  
Child’s Voice 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Within educational settings there is a growing concern about the need to encourage hearing of child’s 
voice. (Haynes, 2009; Lewis, 2010; Lundy, 2007; Messiou, 2006; Moss, 2006). However, within policies 
and pedagogy, there is often minimal representation of child’s agency.  I agree with Jenks that theories 
of child development have constructed child as being deficient of adult characteristics (Jenks, 2010). 
Furthermore, implications the of different conceptions of childhood, which have been discussed in 
previous chapters, have yet to become part of a reconstruction of policies and pedagogies in many 
Western societies, which still perceive adult as decision-maker and which construct child as deficient.    
The complexities in hearing voice are often articulated by romanticism on the part of adult, who claims 
to be hearing what child says, yet he/she does nothing with this (Prout, 2002). 
Historically, conceptions of child and childhood from a Western societal perspective have viewed child 
in terms of an “object of concern rather than persons with voice” (Hallet & Prout, 2003, p. 1).  Thus 
voices were silenced by the dominant constructions of the nature of child as written about from 
various domains (sociology, developmental psychology).  The concept of voice is therefore linked to 
how educators and researchers conceptualise child.  If conceptions of child are dominated by adult 
authority, then schooling contexts will continue to be driven by this authority, where decisions and 
policies are drawn up by adults.  However, recently a strong argument has begun to emerge amongst 
researchers and educators (Jenks, 2010; Prout, 2002) that there is a need to reconceptualise notions of 
childhood.  This reconceptualisation includes child’s voice in research contexts, as well as in contexts 
such as school, where their voices can shape policies and practice.  
 Including child’s voice creates different perspectives about social policy.   This move towards including 
child’s voice has been written about in a number of recent research initiatives and publications on the 
discourse of childhood (Bain, 2010; Biesta, 2011; Jenks, 2010). There is a growing awareness that 
child’s voice needs to be included in the development of policy on all levels. Nevertheless, there is 
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opposition to including child’s voice and there are obstacles that still need critical interrogation. There 
is recognition that participation and inclusion of child’s voice can be possible in deciding policy with the 
acknowledgement of child as capable of making decisions.  Researchers (Bain, 2010; Burke, 2008; 
Jenks, 2010; Kennedy, 2006) with an interest in childhood have begun to examine the connections 
between assumptions and theories of childhood and how these assumptions and theories impact on 
social policy.   Furthermore, working from the perspective that historically child was not perceived as a 
person with voice, the contemporary idea of child’s voice is becoming more accepted. However, as will 
be argued, much like the different conceptions of child and childhood, the idea of child’s voice remains 
a contested issue.   
5.2 Child’s Voice 
 
The discourse of voice has been researched across disciplines such as critical pedagogy, literature and 
critical literacy.  There is an increasing interest by researchers (Alderson, 2008; Burbules, 2003; Clark, 
2005; Hadfield & Haw, 2001; Lundy, 2007) to link voice to young people in terms of rights discourse, 
participation and representation.  Including child’s voice has gained momentum in areas of social 
inclusion. Yet this notion of including voices of young people is open to critique, and questions have 
been raised about issues of power and ways in which educationalists and researchers listen and 
respond to child’s voice. Hadfield and Haw (2007) discussed the concept of voice in terms of a study 
they conducted with young pupils who had been excluded from school.  The study involved action 
research which focused on the expression of voice of young people and alerted Hadfield and Haw to 
the theoretical debates about voice and the practical difficulties in maintaining relationships with the 
young men.  The study revealed that most of the voices ‘voiced’ and listened to, were those between 
educators, rather than between educators and pupils. 
A further argument drawn from the work of Hadfield and Haw (2001) is their problematisation of the 
construct “voice”.  They argue that it has become such a broadly used term that is disconnected from 
theories and the ‘critical praxis’ where it originated. (Hadfield & Haw, 2001, p. 486).  A fundamental 
aspect which they highlight the complexity of voice being an expression of an individual through 
his/her experiences, rather than based on theories.   
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When including child’s voice, there may be a breakdown in the relationship between adult and child.  
Voice entails an expression of meaning and “The struggle for voice begins when a person attempts to 
communicate with someone else” (Britzman in Hadfield & Haw, 2001, p. 487). Furthermore, as 
Hadfield and Haw suggest, voice, especially of young people, may be excluded or marginalised by the 
dominant voices of adults.  A complexity arises as to how adult can guide or facilitate the inclusion of 
child’s voice without domination, especially in cases where child’s voice has already been ignored or 
excluded. There are cultural issues that impact on the inclusion of child’s voice, and Hadfield & Haw 
maintain that “It is culturally specific with its validity arising from who is speaking rather than being 
sanctioned by who is listening” (Hadfield & Haw, 2001, p. 487). The research conducted by Hadfield 
and Haw has attempted to convince adults (researchers, educators) of the need to look beyond 
theoretical notions of voice and critically to examine assumptions (we), as adults, hold when listening 
to child’s voice.  Their main concern has been that educators and researchers working with children in 
classrooms need to give consideration to the validity of child’s voice, especially when one voice speaks 
against others.  There is a tendency for adult to continue to dominate, rather than taking a step back to 
listen to child. 
 The concept of voice according, to Britzman (cited in Thomson, 2008, p. 4) is “taken to mean having a 
say”. However, Britzman extends this meaning further and suggests that the concept spans literal, 
metaphorical and political terrains (Thomson, 2008, p.4).  In a literal sense, voice signifies the speech 
and viewpoint of the speaker.  In a metaphorical sense, it denotes articulation, tone, “accent, style and 
the qualities and feelings conveyed by the speaker’s words” (Thomson, 2008, p. 4).   Britzman 
describes voice in a political sense “as the right of speaking and of being represented” (in Thomson, 
2008, p. 4).  
Thomson (2008) suggests that what is crucial to hearing child’s voice in research and other contexts is 
an obligation on the part of the adult to listen to the voice of child, so that adults do not censor views 
and opinions of child.  Bogdan and Biklen (in Thomson, 2008, p. 204) describe giving voice as 
“empowering people to be heard who might otherwise remain silent” or who have been silenced by 
others. In other words, voice is the right and ability to make oneself heard and to make experiences 
and perspectives available to others.  More importantly, it is a construction of the self and how we 
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represent this self to others.  This idea of representing the self to others could be linked to Derrida’s 
idea of having a quality of self-presence which is then found in the discourse of voice and the 
ownership of one’s voice (Lee, 2001, p. 108).  In many school contexts, child is often not allowed to 
enjoy a quality of “self-presence” or take ownership of voice, as current educational institutions tend 
to be dominated by adult voice, rather than child’s.  
Listening to and acknowledging voice may challenge beliefs and ideas. This takes on a more complex 
dimension as child (and adult) do not speak with one voice but as individuals who have different 
opinions, beliefs and ways of expression. Hadfield and Haw (in Thomson, 2008) draw on this 
complexity by stating that individuals use more than one voice. They propose three voices namely, 
authoritative, critical and therapeutic.  Arnot and Reay (in Thomson, 2008) define another type of 
voice, the pedagogic voice. It is through these four different types of voice that I hope to map an 
analysis of what child’s voice means in school contexts. 
Child’s voice ought to be viewed as a critical component in educational contexts. This ideal is based on 
democratic principles, where an interest in equality, participation, and inclusion of child’s voice is 
paramount.  However, there are moral and ethical implications that come to the fore when educators 
and researchers21 go about hearing the voice of child.  I will discuss the different voices as stipulated 
above to argue that voice of both child and adult is a critical component in a school context.   
Hadfield and Haw (in Thomson, 2008 p. 4) define voice as: 
Authoritative: the voice that speaks on behalf of child.  This is a pertinent conception of voice when 
building a strong argument for including child’s voice, specifically as voice understood as authoritative 
is embedded in the policies that are representative of a collective body, namely, the Department of 
Education where, the Authoritative voices are the voices representing policy documents and curricula.  
                                                          
21
 The limitations of this research do not allow for a discussion of the problematisation of these ethical issues that have 
been exposed through research initiatives geared to acknowledging child’s voice.  A huge concern is the inclusion of the 
voices of children that are silenced, by disability.  Adult’s role is another important factor that is problematized in terms  of 
listening to authentic voice.  Lundy,(2007 p.17) suggests that “child’s voice is a radical agenda” and that much of the work 
on ‘child’s voice’ “falls short of what is needed” ( Lundy,2007, p17) For further reading see Lundy, (2007) 
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On an institutional level, there are the educators’, parents’ and other adults’ authoritative voices which 
are making decisions for child. 
 
Critical: The voice that challenges the status quo.  This is the voice that is heard in practice and in the 
implementation of policies.  This is the voice that I, as researcher, use when critically examining what it 
means to include child’s voice and to recognise the importance of listening to child’s voice. However, it 
may still exclude and marginalise or silence child’s voice.  An interesting point that Hadfield and Haw 
(2001, p. 5) make is that this voice puts perspectives into the “public arena that are rarely, if ever, 
heard”. 
 
Therapeutic: this voice offers child a safe place to deal with traumatic events and experiences, and 
suggests that this is the voice used in research with vulnerable child or in therapeutic interventions.  In 
these contexts, voice would deal with ethical considerations when working with child so that “no harm 
comes to child” (Hadfield & Haw, 2001, p. 5). Therapeutic voice links to my own professional practise. I 
deal with child in a supportive role through interventions with learning support. I have made a pivotal 
shift in thinking and practise through my own growing awareness of how my views of child and voice 
have been shaped by exposure to different pedagogies and conceptions of child.  Therapeutic voice has 
also made me question the ways in which I listen to child’s voice and whether I am, in fact, open to and 
respectful of child’s concerns. 
 
Pedagogic: This voice is one created by the schooling context. This links to Fricker’s notion of power, 
where she describes power “as a capacity on the part of social agents (individuals, groups, or 
institutions) exercised in respect of other social agents” (Fricker, 2007, p. 10). In this instance, the 
power lies in the voices of the social agents: the individuals (parents and educators), groups 
(communities, school boards) and institutions (school, departments of education and wider political 
systems, such as politicians and policy makers who draw up policies and regulate schooling as a 
complex social structure). It is voice created by “experiences of being educated within particular kinds 
of pedagogic, curriculum and assessment regimes” (Thomson, 2008 p. 5). As a result, it may not always 
be “authentic and pure”.   Pedagogic voice has a significant impact on the central focus of this research 
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report, as it is discussed in terms of including child’s voice in the schooling context as it highlights 
issues of what it means to include voice that has been absent.  
5.3 Voice in Research: Different perspectives 
 
Researchers committed to finding ways of including child’s voice, have suggested that listening to 
young voices enables child to articulate their experiences.  A shift in opinions of how adult views child 
has resulted in more being written in literature about finding ways of bringing these unheard voices 
into “professional and scholarly conversations” (Thomson, 2008, p. 3).  This research has opened up 
the potential to allow previously disadvantaged or marginalised voices to be included. However, there 
are still many issues that colour this notion.  An important aspect of researchers and practitioners has 
been to acknowledge the power relationships integral to listening to child’s voice. What has worked 
against this notion is a question as to whether child’s voice is being truthfully represented and 
acknowledged, or wether adult voice is still dominating the process.  
The act of giving voice voice can emphasise the very systems of marginalisiation that it seeks to 
restore. This is evident in Burman’s critique of the idea of power relationships. Burman suggests “that 
developmental work [fieldwork] when conducting research,  in terms of the act of giving voice, runs 
the risk of simultaneous exposure and surveillance” (Burman, 2008, p. 12). This risk of exposure and 
surveillance assumes that the person or persons (child) being heard has no voice and therefore needs 
someone (adult) to report on their experiences.  Burman cautions that empowering communities that 
are already marginalised may result in these communities falling into a further cycle of 
disempowerment and manipulation.  Her concern is that practices of giving voice may fail to take into 
consideration the power struggles within these communities and the entrenchment of political, 
cultural and spatial complexities of the processes of translation and interpretation. 
 Thus, Burman (2008) suggests that giving voice, may hamper actually representation. It would be 
difficult to assertain whether this act of voice is merely superficial and in fact still represents a 
dominant voice. Linking the above notion to child and how child, as part of a community, is given 
representation within school contexts, there is often talk of representation and participation. However, 
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this is often ignored by the policies and systems already in place regarding matters that affect child.  
Child develops new knowledge as he/she interacts through the different social interactions via 
relationships, identities and social contexts.  Talk is an important element of everyday experiences.  In 
a school context, I have observed a number of incidents where child can be engaged in collaborative 
talk, such as in the classroom, on the playground and with the educator.  If educators view child as not 
being capable of making decisions or offering opinions, then child’s voice is absent, or silenced, rather 
than heard.  It is often the voice of the educator or adult [voice of authority], that dominates social 
interactions in educational contexts. I agree with Burman (2008) that this domination of adult voice 
denies that child has his/her own voice as there is no acknowledgement that child does in fact have a 
voice which he/she is able to exercise and use. I cannot make the assumption that by attempting to 
give voice to child, that this voice will be free from my own perceptions and interpretations. In many 
encounters with children in my own classroom practice, I too was guilty of not creating enough 
opportunities for child to have a voice.  It was often far easier for me as adult to dominate the 
interactions, as the adult knower.  
 Critics of traditional education argue that the practices outlined above fail to recognise that children 
are regarded as powerful people, rather than people in the making.  John (2003) argues that child must 
become a contributor to debates on social accountability and freedom, as the voice of the child is 
under-acknowledged through normative practices that are dominated by adult voice.  I realise that 
critiquing the traditional notions of child’s voice has implications for myself in terms of thinking about 
my ‘own’ voice and identity, and how I hold power and represent, or speak on behalf of, child. 
 From a critical pedagogical22 perspective, McLaren (2007) draws on the argument that there needs to 
be a shift in how educators and students produce and reconstruct meaning in classroom contexts.  He 
suggests that the theory of learning and teaching evolves around the concept of voice.  His work 
focuses on the concept of voice as made explicit by the writings of Giroux, who defines voice as a set of 
                                                          
22
 Critical pedagogy is a theory based on how education can provide students with tools to better themselves and 
strengthen democracy.  (Giroux & McLaren, 1994 p.30) claim that “critical pedagogy signals how questions of audience, 
power and evaluation actively work to construct particular relations between teachers and students, institutions and 
classrooms and communities…. Pedagogy in the critical sense illuminates the relationship between knowledge, authority 
and power”(Giroux & McLaren, 1994,p31) 
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meanings that are interconnected and multi-layered through the act of dialogue between student and 
teacher.  McLaren (2007, p. 243) develops this argument further by suggesting that voice must be 
viewed as an important pedagogical concept as it is embedded in a discourse that is “historically and 
culturally mediated”.  Voice can thus be defined as an internal discourse that is private.  However, 
McLaren (2007, p. 243) argues that this discourse cannot be understood “without situating it in a 
universe of shared meanings”.  It is at this point that I situate my own questioning of child’s voice, 
within an educational context.  If voice mediates and shapes experience and reality, due to its situated 
cultural and historical contexts, then how do schools allow child to affirm their own individual and 
collective voices, when there are power-relations and policies that do not allow individual voice to be 
heard? 
One of the most influential works on language and thought that has impacted on my professional 
practice was the work of the Russian psychologist, Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934). He believed that children 
learn through dialogue via a ‘social other’, the ‘social other’ being an educator or in a broader context 
through social interactions with other individuals who are able to mediate this knowledge.  This social 
interaction via dialogue influences the conceptual development of child.  Vygotsky believed that social 
interaction and conceptual development are interdependent on one another. If social interaction and 
the process of conceptual development are important for constructing knowledge (in both a social and 
school context), then the importance of voice, and in my analysis, child’s voice, should play a central 
role in decisions and the conceptual development of child.   
Vygotsky (1986) agreed with Dewey’s notion (1930) that teaching as a means merely of transferring 
knowledge was pedagogically useless.  Vygotsky believed that there was a strong relationship between 
human activity and consciousness.  The central focus of his theory stated that the mental activities of a 
human being are adapted through social interaction into his cultural historical environment.  Vygotsky 
rejected Piaget’s idea (chapter 3) that child is gradually socialised in such a way that consciousness 
arises through disequilibrium (conflicts and failures) with the assumed more mature thinking of an 
adult.  In contrast to this view, Vygotsky believed that the child is a social being who is able to interact 
with adult through action.  Through this social interaction, individualization takes place.   
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Vygotsky believed that speech and action are part of a complex psychological function, aimed at 
problem-solving. This supports my argument about child’s voice.  Furthermore, he posited that in 
child’s actions to solve problems, speech is crucial, as at the same time it starts to control child’s 
behaviour.  Vygotsky maintains that once child begins to use language as a tool, problem-solving takes 
place at the time when the socialised speech directed at adults becomes internal (Vygotsky, 1986). If 
opportunities to listen to child’s voice are neglected, then how can effective learning take place or 
child’s voice be considered? 
In sum, for Dewey (1930) and Vygotsky (1986), child is able to build his/her identity in the process of 
interaction with other members of a community or context.  Crucial is the need to include child’s voice 
in the process.  However, this in itself is problematic, as there are many instances where adult remains 
the dominant force that drives policy, practice and conceptions of child.  How then do adults open up 
real possibilities for including child’s voice? 
5.4 Voice as a critical component 
 
 Voice is a critical component on the agenda of researchers and practitioners who maintain that 
historically, social and cultural practices disregard child’s voice, and this leads to marginalization.  
Haynes suggests that there has been a recent move by researchers and practitioners “to find ways of 
working and consulting with children, so as to ensure that children’s voices are heard in all matters 
that affect them”  (Haynes, 2009, p. 28).  
From a sociological perspective, sociologists agree that voice and agency are children’s rights.  Pufall 
and Unsworth (2004) interpret “voice” as conveying intent, and furthermore this expression of intent 
leads to a sense of self-agency.  Voice refers to “that cluster of intentions, hopes and grievances and 
expectations that children guard as their own [and] to the fact that children are much more self-
determining actors than we think” (Pufall and Unsworth, 2004).  This notion is reflected in the work of 
Haynes (2009), (Haynes & Murris, 2011) and Kennedy (2009). They all agree that in educational 
contexts child is often seen as less competent and thus unable to make decisions on their own, without 
adult domination of policy and practice in school contexts. 
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However, a complexity arises when finding ways to hear child.  Haynes (2009, p. 28) claims that there is 
a need to problematize what is meant by “listening to children’s voices” especially when dealing with 
issues such as how children can be included as contributors to their learning and school context.   If 
child is viewed as being incompetent, the effect is that child is socialised into viewing himself/herself in 
this manner and, as a consequence, his/her learning will be muted.   
In drawing on an analysis of the different types of voice that may come into play when hearing child’s 
voice in a school context, different perspectives as to how adult and child relate emerge.  Adult voice 
assumes an agenda that suggests adult is always right and may thus judge child from this perspective. 
Child’s voice is thus made to fit into adult’s agenda and through this agenda adult justifies decisions 
and reasons for not including child’s voice.  However, if the authoritative voice is child’s, it may denote 
an ‘authentic’ voice that shares a common interest. Hadfield and Haw’s research (2001) gave authority 
to young voices in that they were able to share their experiences about matters that affected them in 
their school contexts. 
If adult voice is critical, it may challenge the way in which child’s voice is heard and attempt to 
influence the power relationships between adult and child.  An educator expressing a critical voice may 
challenge policies in place regarding inclusion of child’s voice and encourage dialogue and more 
interaction between adult’s voice and child’s voice.  A critical voice needs to have a clear purpose that 
sets out to challenge views and prejudices.  A critical voice will, as Haynes (2009) suggests, 
problematize what is meant by listening to child’s voice. 
In order to begin to problematize this notion of listening to child’s voice, Lundy (2007) suggests that 
listening to children can be understood in terms of a framework that may provide guidance in the 
cultivation of child’s voice. Her framework suggests that four concepts namely; space, voice, audience 
and influence are a basis from which to listen to child’s voice.  ‘Space’ suggests that child must be given 
an opportunity to express a view. Here, challenges may arise as to which views are acknowledged and 
what opportunities are created to include child’s voice. ‘Voice’, according to Lundy (2007), suggests 
that children must be facilitated to express their views. This may have a positive or negative impact.  If 
facilitation is based on a more consultative basis, where the domination of power between adult and 
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child is equal and child is able to openly express views, then this will have a positive impact on a child’s 
notion of self as an individual who is capable of voicing. Conversely, if facilitation involves adult 
domination, then child’s voice may not be authentic, as views may be altered or shaped by adult.  In a 
sense, adult would be in danger of performing an epistemic injustice, as referred to in chapter four.  
‘Influence’ denotes that child’s view should be acted upon appropriately, and herein lies a danger; 
adult needs to be careful about how he/she goes about listening to and hearing child’s voice. Listening 
to child’s voice needs to be reflexive so as not to influence the view voiced by child.  ‘Audience’ 
suggests that child’s view must be listened to and that complexities may arise in terms of how adult 
conceptualises child and interprets child’s view.  An important issue here is that throughout the 
process of hearing child’s voice, there may be limitations with regard to ethical issues when including 
child’s voice and, more importantly, in working with children who are disabled or whose 
communication is impeded.  This may cause uneasiness in adults and therefore child’s voice may be 
silenced. On a more positive note, this framework grounds a concept of dialogue that encourages and 
informs an understanding of child’s voice. Furthermore, Lundy (2007) argues that ‘space’ and ‘voice’ 
tend to focus on a more participatory approach when acknowledging child’s voice. A rights-based 
approach chapter six will focus on ensuring that ‘audience’ and ‘influence’ are given due weight when 
consulting with children. 
This view is supported by the writings of Haynes (2009), Kennedy and Kennedy (2011), and Kohan 
(2011), who propose that hearing child’s voice is essential to educational change.  Although there are 
mechanisms in policy to include child’s voice, there is often a gap between policy and practice.   
Including child’s voice links to a pedagogy of listening where there is a legitimisation that an 
individual’s experiences are essential.  Critics argue that a pedagogy of listening is a difficult notion to 
achieve, given that in order to include child’s voice, there is a need to understand how a school system 
is structured and organised.  It is through these organising principles and structures that decisions and 
dominant powers directly impact on including child’s voice.   
Haynes (2009), Kennedy and Kennedy (2011), Kohan (2011), Lundy (2007) present an opportunity for 
including and listening to child’s voice, and suggest that opportunities for listening and including child’s 
voice are critical.  Classroom practice needs to be carefully constructed to allow for dialogue and 
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meaningful engagement. Dialogue, according to Burbules (2003) is a democratic activity that should 
fundamentally give participants an opportunity for voice.  In creating these opportunities, it is also 
important to consider that not all children are willing to engage or able to engage with opportunities.  
In many instances, as with Lundy’s suggested framework, adult may need to empower child to use 
his/her voice.  Through programmes such as P4C that encourage meaningful dialogue, these 
opportunities can be fostered and developed to include child’s voice. 
5.5 Connections between listening and voice 
 
In highlighting what is problematic in normative practices and education communities, specifically 
when addressing the notion of listening to child’s voice, it is important to consider the relationship 
between the concepts of voice and listening and the links to the relationship between categories of 
voice discussed above. These different types of voice (authoritative, critical, therapeutic and 
pedagogical) are viewed by people in different ways.  To some, ‘voice’ is merely an expression of 
thought.  To others, it is an act of meaningful participation and it is through participation where child 
engages with institutions (school), structures (policies and curricula, classroom pedagogies) and 
communities (families, friends, school communities) that this act of participation may shape his/her 
life.  Through these different types of voice, specific meanings, specific arguments and issues around 
voice need to be unravelled.  It is important to be aware of the issues that arise, specifically when 
listening to child’s voice. Messiou (2006) suggests that child’s voice needs to be acknowledged as an 
expression of being inclusive rather than just as an approach to understanding and developing 
practices to include child’s voice.  
The primary role of listening to child’s voice is to attempt to facilitate a kind of listening that, 
specifically in my role as a learning support specialist, leads to a powerful exchange with children.  
Unfortunately, in many instances, child’s expression of voice is absent from issues and decisions that 
affect their experiences at school.  The voices of children that I have previously worked with are often 
not heard in the sense that I, as adult, ignore the ‘therapeutic and authorative’ voice of the child. If 
there was an acknowledgement of voice I often did not often take it seriously, nor did the other adults 
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involved in decision-making process.  In retrospect, I realise that often I spoke with an authoritative or 
pedagogic voice that did not listen to child, or I merely downplayed the seriousness of their 
contributions because of my own professional judgment, or in some cases, because of the system that 
abstracted the child from the process. I, as the social actor, was in many instances committing what 
Fricker (2007) would refer to as an epistemic injustice.  Using my credibility as Learning Support 
Specialist (knower), I had wronged many of the children (hearers) I worked with, by undermining their 
capacities as knower. Furthermore, the parents and children assumed that I was in the position to 
provide the intervention needed to attain academic success or competence of the child. 
Another challenge when listening to child is to balance the power between adult and child.  
Educationalists shouldn’t ignore that these issues of power exist and that, in listening to child, these 
issues are exposed.  It is also important to be mindful of the dangers of power relationships in which 
adults may exploit the information that children give to adult.  Another complexity is the 
disengagement of adults and children, where adults come from a position of an adult world rather 
than a child’s world.  
To illustrate this positioning of the adult-child relationship, Fricker refers to power as discussed earlier 
as ‘identity power’. She develops this further by making a distinction between power that can operate 
‘actively’ and ‘passively’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 9).  Relating this to the challenges of listening to child, active 
power would prevail when the adult (educator) uses power to reward a child with a sticker or punish a 
child by hitting.  Passive power is the belief that, because I am adult (educator) in a school, my position 
has institutional force. I may not reward or punish; however, the mere fact that I can punish or reward 
will have an influence on the way in which child behaves and responds. 
In sum, relationships are multifaceted. They can take many forms in terms of an action, reflection, a 
better understanding, disengagement, or the moral aspects of such an encounter.  Coupled with this 
are the strong links mentioned in this research between how we conceptualize childhood and how we 
view ourselves [adult].  When interacting with child, different views regarding the relationship 
between adult and child are shaped by the way in which we conceptualise childhood.   
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5.6 Developing a culture of Listening 
 
Recent research conducted by Clark (2004, 2007) and Moss (Clark & Moss, 2001) has referred to the 
principles behind the pedagogy of listening to child’s voice.  Their writing advocates that there needs to 
be a respectful culture of listening between adults and children, when consulting with children on 
matters of research.  Furthermore, listening is vital for practitioners and adults who work with children, 
as researchers argue that this develops opportunities for decision-making by both adult and children. 
Listening is defined as the “active process of communication involving hearing, interpreting and 
constructing meanings; not limited to the spoken word; and a necessary stage in participation in a) a 
daily routine, as well as b) wider decision –making” (Clark & Moss, 2005, p. 491).  This resonates with 
the notion of including child’s voice, as it challenges previous dominant approaches that see child as 
passive recipients in their own learning and development.  It would be naïve to suggest that listening to 
child’s voice is not problematic. There are a number of complex issues that still provide spaces for 
debate.  Research on child and childhood, as previously argued, is embedded in different perceptions 
and social and cultural practices that differ across different research domains.  Educational institutions 
develop policies and practices based on adult’s voice rather than child’s voice.   
A dominant force that hampers child’s voice in terms of decision-making and policy development is the 
assumption that child is not competent enough to have a say in decisions about their schooling and 
learning.  If listening to child is an acknowledgement of child being capable of expression of his/her 
own, I agree with Hallet and Prout (2003) that hearing child’s voice is crucial in all institutions at all 
levels of society. It is these encounters between adult and child that enable child to express a voice 
and, with this in mind, policies and procedures can be redesigned and formulated.  Adult is therefore 
‘entering’ child’s world, rather than fitting child into adult’s world. Kennedy (2006b) suggests that if 
children do know the world differently from adults, then the notion of child’s voice is often 
marginalised and excluded from adult voice.  He argues that adults need to enquire about what it is 
like to be children as they (adults) were once children who experienced childhood. This argument 
suggests an investigation of similarities and differences between “the ways children and adults know 
the world” (Kennedy, 2006b).  Simms (2008) would agree with Kennedy as she claims that even though 
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we (adults) are surrounded by children, we are not always able to enter child’s world.  Her argument 
rests on the premise that adults view the world via a mature perspective and that adults tend to 
rationalise about child.  She questions how much an adult can actually experience what is means to be 
the child in the world.   
This polarising of the concepts adult and child leads to the assumption that hearing child’s voice is 
often not authentic. Many concerns are raised when unpacking the notion of authenticity.  Are 
researchers and practitioners able to know child’s perspectives and experiences fully?  The critique 
directed at developmental psychology is that it sees child as a becoming and not a being. This raises 
issues of whether a child can express self-agency in matters concerning his/her experiences and 
choices.   Haynes (2009) grapples with this notion when she mentions that, as a practitioner, she began 
to question her own practise of listening to child’s voice in an open and respectful manner, rather than 
making assumptions about what child is going to say.  Adult participation with child is affected by 
his/her own childhood experiences, by his/her constructions of child and childhood, and whether child 
is recognized as having power and agency. 
5.7 The Complexities of child’s voice in education 
 
As discussed previously, I referred to Thomson’s discussion of research on voice, conducted by Arnot 
and Reay (2007) and Hadfield and Haw (2001).  They also suggest that voice is a critical component 
when interacting with child.  They highlight the complexity involved in hearing child’s voice and situate 
these complexities within differences in social contexts and the responses of child to adult when 
communicating.  Furthermore, as argued throughout this research report, the responses of adult when 
listening to child are often determined by how adult conceptualises child.  It is through the lenses of 
the different conceptions and diverse cultural backgrounds that adult may base his/her assumptions as 
to which aspects of child’s voice can be included or acknowledged.  Moreover, if there is a need to 
view child’s voice as a critical component of an educational context, then with this comes the difficulty 
of ascertaining whether child’s voice is genuine or merely represented by adult.  Child’s responses are 
limited by adult’s intimidation or child may feel obliged to answer what adult wants. Therefore 
including voice of child is not an easy task.  Thomson (2008) suggests that a particular voice is shaped 
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by responses to specific situations, periods, and questions.  This highlights the complexities involved in 
including child’s voice.  
A number of assumptions regarding the worth of child’s voice are central to the argument Hadfield and 
Haw (2001) present. They alert professionals to examine these assumptions when working with young 
voices.  Firstly, they argue that the way in which child is conceptualised by society has a major impact 
on how voices are acknowledged.  The assumption that child is best able to talk about their 
experiences of being child, may be viewed through different lenses by adult.  From a developmental 
position, child may be viewed as ‘immature’ and therefore not able to express a view or opinion 
because of a lack of cognitive ability.  Professionals and educators working from a developmental 
paradigm may thus ignore child’s voice, as the assumption is that child is too young to form an opinion 
or to express a view.  This has wide-ranging consequences for including child’s voice in a classroom 
context.  Hadfield and Haw (2001) suggest that the extreme of this view is that a tension arises 
between recognising that young people have a voice, as well as viewing them as lacking experience or 
maturity.  This relates to the previous chapters which discussed conceptions of childhood and 
capabilities of child.  Once again, there is a power struggle between adult and child; adult may listen to 
voice, but to what extent does adult then take cognisance of child’s voice and take action when 
listening to child’s views?  Researchers such as Bain (2010), Clark (2007) and Lewis (2007) question the 
extent to which child’s voice is critically included in and whether child has the opportunity to voice 
their own perspectives. 
Another assumption, drawing on Hadfield and Haw (2001) is the problematisation of meaning.  These 
authors discuss adult’s assumptions that if child voices their views it is seen as something worthwhile 
to child and through this voicing of views child will learn from what they are saying.  Hadfield and Haw 
(2001) link this argument to the notion that professionals influence child’s voice by engaging with child 
and expecting child to respond to what they (adult) want or expect to hear.  They challenge the 
assumption that child needs guidance or help from adult to find his/her voice because adult fails to 
recognise that child is already able to express him/herself.  An important argument raised by Hadfield 
and Haw is that “research and policy development tends to fall back on those who are verbally 
articulate and self-confident” (Hadfield & Haw, 2001, p. 494). This has huge consequences for child 
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who is not articulate and who is therefore excluded from voicing an opinion or labelled as not 
competent.  
Expanding on the above assumptions, there is literature for example Lewis (2007), Lundy (2007) and 
Moss (2006) that has suggested that professionals are often distanced from young voices.  In the 
research field, researching child and listening to child’s voice may be for a limited period or may 
provide little opportunity for expression of voice.  Once again, there is a strong argument that the adult 
voice dominates and a critique lies with the fact that child may not know who the audience for his/her 
voice is.  Hadfield and Haw (2001, p. 488) claim that, in practice, when listening to child’s voice, there is 
no kind of voice “most likely to get a reaction”. They claim that researchers and educators tend to 
concentrate on the practicalities of hearing voice rather than concentrating on the moral issues, such 
as undervaluing child’s views.   It is thus crucial that researchers and practitioners take heed of the 
importance of interactions with children, carefully considering these interactions so that child’s voice 
acknowledged. They envisage complexities with how child’s voice is framed within existing structures 
in educational contexts “by what and how they are asked” (Hadfield & Haw, 2001, p. 488). This may, in 
fact, marginalise child and possibly impacting on the effect child’s voice may have on policies and 
matters where he/she has a right to be heard. 
A strong argument linking to the assumptions already noted is Hadfield and Haw’s critique of the many 
research projects that have sprung up in recent years to attempt to get the voices of young children 
heard.  Their concern is that, although there have been research endeavours using different 
methodologies and ideas for working with child and specifically, reaching out to child who has been 
previously excluded, they argue that none of these endeavours has been able to change policy or wider 
social issues.  There is still an absence of child’s voice making a difference to policies or curricula and 
they appeal to professionals working with child to question why these endeavours have failed to have 
an impact.  A plausible claim is that there is a tension between participation and representation 
(Hadfield & Haw, 2001).   I find it equally disturbing that often child’s voice may be represented, but 
this voice is diluted through the structures and systems that are created by the dominant voice of 
adult. 
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There is a need to think beyond these dualisms of adult and child that excludes voice of child.  My 
focus has been to argue that including child’s voice is an important aspect for education as these voices 
may influence the way in which educators and researchers view child and acknowledge child’s 
capabilities.  It is important too, to be mindful of the difficulties and challenges involved in including 
child’s voice. Questions are raised as to how adult listens to voice. Is there legitimacy and 
acknowledgement or do adults acknowledge a voice but undervalue its significance in the process? As 
an educator I would suggest that a way of including child’s voice could lie in the arguments tabled by 
proponents of the P4C/PwC movement.  Using P4C/PwC  as a vehicle for moving towards striking a  
balance between representation and participation, is the claim made by Vansiegeleghem & Kennedy 
(2011, p. 177) that philosophy can be used as a means of developing child in terms of acknowledging 
that he/she has a potential of power.  In this regard, philosophy aims to “neutralise unequal power 
relations” and strengthens child through a process of communication and cooperation. The unpacking 
of the concept voice is essential in exploring how child’s voice ought to be heard or how and why it 
should be included is absent from educational contexts.  It is also important to consider that it is 
through an individual’s multiple voices, that a child’s voice is considered as a valuable component in 
reshaping policies and practice. Thus, neutralising unequal power relations may link to Cook & Cook’s 
(2009), John’s (2003) and Kennedy’s (2006b) notions that adult/ child relationships need to be 
questioned in terms of child’s position in schools and the wider society.  
In sum, voice is often silenced by forces which dominate the reshaping of policies and practice.  These 
dominant power relationships of adult and child, gender, disability, culture and race can have a lasting 
impact on silencing voice.  There is a strong call for professionals working with children to challenge 
the criticisms involved in including child’s voice and to question assumptions of how we think about 
child, as well as how we work with child in terms of the contributions he/she can make to educational 
policies and on decisions affecting his/her life.  
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5.8 Rights and Policies pertaining to Child’s Voice  
 
There is a need to be more critical of the way that the rights of child are framed in decision-making.  
There are two important, competing ideologies of how we understand the meaning of rights of child.  
The first ideology focuses on rights as an exercising of power. Written from a legal perspective, this 
situates the rights of a child according to the legislation and to the rights of the child in the context of 
inclusion or exclusion from school.  The competing ideology is the rights of parental-authority which 
argues that parents or guardians hold power over children, in terms of protection. These two 
ideologies set up a debate between protection-based rights, which encompass viewing child from 
deficit position (vulnerable, weak) in need of adult power and authority, and viewing child from an 
autonomous rights position (recognition of personhood).   
Both ideologies have an impact on child, and advocates of children’s rights have acknowledged the 
need for changes in perceptions of how these rights are executed. This invites a critical perspective, 
specifically when referring to the notion of child’s voice.  Lundy (2007) provides a children’s rights 
critique on the concept of child’s voice, arguing that Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC, UN, 1989) recognises that child is a full human being who has the right to 
participate freely in society. However she suggests that there is a gap between what is enshrined in the 
article as legally binding and what is interpreted in practice. Lundy (2007) develops this critique by 
claiming that Article 12 is controversial, as it has been misunderstood, in terms of hearing child’s voice.   
Her research has attempted to highlight the controversial underpinnings in the phrasing of 23Article 12 
“right to be heard, right to be consulted and right to participate” (UN, 1989).  
                                                          
23
 Article 12  United Nations Conventions of the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989) 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views 
freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and 
maturity of the child.  
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While Children’s rights are widely recognised as being important in reconceptualising childhood, 
children’s rights cannot be viewed as a universal construct, as its meanings are constantly changing 
across different cultures and discourses. (This argument will be developed in chapter 6). If a universal 
stance is taken by educationalists and researchers, then child becomes an object viewed through adult 
perceptions. Lundy (2007)24  argues that this voice is dependent on the ability to form a view, whether 
this is ‘mature’ or not. This notion will be developed in the next chapter, where a link is made to the 
United National Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).   Archard (2010) would agree that 
there is a need to acknowledge a child’s emerging capacity when listening to voice.   He suggests that 
focussing on child’s emerging competencies, rather than viewing child through the definitions of 
maturity or immaturity, is just.   Furthermore, decisions based on this developmental bias would be 
unfair and unjust when adults make decisions dependent on age and maturity of child.  Matthews 
terms this “evolutionary bias” (Matthews, 1996b, p. 17) and suggests that, children are “fresh and 
innovative thinkers,” thus questioning adult’s biased view that because child is a product of fixed 
developmental growth, maturity will only develop when the child reaches his/her teens. 
5.9 Obstacles to hearing child’s voice 
 
Hearing child’s voice is not without risks.  Research undertaken by Cannella and Viruru (2006)  suggest 
that “when voice is conferred upon the other without recognizing or attempting to alter the 
inequalities that created the original distinctions, the giving of voice or listening to, just becomes 
another colonizing apparatus” (cited in Moss, 2006, p. 28).  Burman’s work on developmentalism 
draws on an interesting parallel with Cannella and Viruru’s notion of altering inequalities, where issues 
of power and inequality can undermine how adult views child as competent or qualifying in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent 
with the procedural rules of national law.  
 
24
 Lundy carried out a research project on behalf of the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People.  Her 
research findings reflect that the most important issue raised by the children she interviewed in Northern Ireland, was that 
children expressed that not having a say in decisions was problematic.  The conclusions reached were that children’s views 
were not sought or listened …. They were afforded only minimalist tokenistic opportunities to participate and engage with 
adults (Lundy, 2007  p.929) 
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meeting standards.  Another risk that Moss (2006) and Lundy (2007) refer to is the issue of tokenism:  
they caution that often listening can become a reinforcer of power, rather than a resisting of power.   A 
danger that also arises is that listening can become a regulator of behaviour by which adult can control 
child more effectively because child can listen to what adult says. 
Moss (2006) claims that perspectives of children need to be accounted for when adults engage in 
listening. He regards this process as a way of being. He argues that children have a right to be listened 
to, and the right for child to be heard is only one basis to justify the importance of listening.  He claims 
that in order to listen, there needs to be a culture of listening that extends beyond working 
environments. It should, however, infiltrate all aspects of living. 
In his work in childhood development, Moss introduces the argument that there are tools and 
procedures involved in listening to others. However, important as these are, there needs to be an 
exploration of the following questions; “As a culture, as a society, do we want to listen to one another? 
Do we want to conduct democratic relationships?” (Moss, 2006, p. 30). He draws on the work of Ole 
Langsted, a Danish researcher whose definition of listening prompted him to question the influence 
adults hold over children “More important [than structures and tools] is a cultural climate that shapes 
the ideas that adults in a particular society hold about children.  “The wish to listen to and involve 
children originates in this cultural climate” (Moss, 2006, p. 30). 
Issues raised as to the inclusion of child’s voice have been highlighted by Schiller and Einarsdottir 
(2009, p. 127), who question “whether the pendulum had swung too far with children’s voices seen as 
the most important factor”. This was raised in the context of doing research with children. However, I 
take this argument into other contexts, where child’s voice ought to be heard.  Another strong critique 
lies with the assumption that perhaps adults are asking too much of child, in research contexts, rather 
than addressing what it means to be child.  
Mannion (2007) suggests that in order to acknowledge child’s voice, participation needs to be re-
framed as primarily about adult-child relations. Similarly, Burman suggests that the notions of space 
and time that children live in need to be taken into consideration.  Herein lies the argument that there 
is a tension between the ways in which the adult-child dichotomy is conceptualised where adult is 
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dominant.  As adult continues to view child through a dominant Western philosophical lens, (chapter 
four) acknowledgment of child’s voice will continue to remain undervalued.  If childhood continues to 
be identified by an essentialist view held by many, then notions of space and time will continue to be 
viewed as irrelevant.  Questions need to be asked as to how childhood has changed over time and how 
these changes have affected the experiences of child.  Taking experiences of children into account may 
threaten the childhood experience that adults have had.  Consequently, adults may wish to defend this 
childhood they have come to know.  In this regard, the adult may fear that by taking the child’s 
experiences of his/her world into account may dismantle the power relationship between adult and 
child. 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter argued that the notion of child’s voice reproduces power relations and the binary 
distinction between adult and child. These binary distinctions assume a power relationship where one 
term is privileged and this is usually adult. I have argued that the relationship between educator and 
child often reinforces the normative or conventional constructions we hold about child and childhood.  
The growing debate concerning including child’s voice extends to developing a culture of listening and 
engagement with adult and child.  Advocates of child’s voice, arguing from a rights perspective, (which 
was touched on in this chapter and which will be explored further in the next) interrogate the power 
relations between adult and child and the idea that adult has a natural right to exert power over 
children.   
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Chapter Six    
Child’s Rights 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, children’s rights were introduced in relation to the concept of giving child a 
voice. This chapter will build on the ideas previously discussed and offer a broader view of the 
complexities involved in acknowledging the rights of children.  The concept ‘rights’ is difficult to define 
(Alderson, 2000).  There are many different and conflicting understandings about what constitutes 
children’s rights.  Alderson (2000, p. 13) claims “the concept of children’s rights is a slogan in search of 
a definition”. Indeed, the rights discourse in general has been challenged, as well as the idea of 
children’s rights. Debates continue to be held as to whether different nations view children’s rights 
differently based on their established conceptions of child, and many critics have argued that rights can 
be misleading in matters concerning children. The on-going debates and the establishment of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)25 have prompted questions about the 
concept of children’s rights and their meaning in theory and educational practice (UNCRC, 1989). 
Researchers and practitioners with an interest in childhood have continued to problematize the 
interpretation of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child and its implementation on a 
global level. For the purpose of this research I will focus on its implementation in educational contexts. 
A central debate surrounding rights emerges when considering whether children should have rights 
and whose obligation it is to meet those rights. To promote rights effectively requires practitioners to 
move beyond the theoretical underpinnings and recognise that children are entitled to participate in 
education.  Yet, in many real instances, children have no real role to play in educational decisions 
concerning them.   
6.2 Background 
 
                                                          
25
 I will use the acronym UNCRC throughout the chapter to refer to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 
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The United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the Rights of the Child 
in 1989.  In 1990 these rights were entered into International Law. The Convention is a broad 
internationally binding agreement of the rights of children.  It contains 54 Articles outlining children’s 
rights in terms of civil and political rights, social, economic, and cultural rights, and the protection 
rights.  The Convention, defines a child as a person under the age of 18 years. The Convention contains 
four sections namely: 
 the Preamble: the major underlying principles are contextualised in this section 
 the Substantive articles: (Part I Articles 1-41).  These Articles define the obligations of  
governments  with regard to children’s rights 
 the Implementation of provisions (Part II Articles 42-45) defines how compliance with 
the UNCRC is to be monitored and fostered 
 the conditions under which the UNCRC comes into force (Part III, Articles 46-54) 
United Nations Organisation (1989). 
The Convention affords children a number of rights, but central to this research report are:   Article 3, 
the right to have their [the child’s] “best interests” to be a “primary consideration” in all actions 
concerning them; Article 6, “the inherent right to life”; and Article 12, the right of a “child who is 
capable of forming his or her own views… to express these views freely in all matters affecting the 
child” (UNCRC, 1989).  The Convention pledges to uphold the view that child is an independent bearer 
of rights and undertakes that children will be given a more active role in decision-making processes. It 
calls upon states to provide opportunities for youth to participate in the public sphere.  
 
6.3  Children’s Rights Discourse: Participation and Voice 
6.3.1 Traditional View 
 
Mary John’s work (2003) on Children’s Rights and Power, critiques the domain of developmental 
psychology as being related to “an epistemological framework”. She describes this as the “cult of the 
expert, emphasizing that psychological procedures distance the subject matter under investigation” 
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(John, 2003, p. 59).  It is at this junction that a need arises to deepen our understandings of what rights 
mean and to examine critically how they ought to be afforded.  John (2003) critiques the historical 
conceptualization of children’s rights as distancing child from a rights discourse.  She suggests that a 
rights discourse ought to give agency to child rather than distance child from his/her rights. The notion 
of a discourse of children’s rights has thus become a central component of the rights discourse, and 
this has raised awareness and debate, specifically relating to how we conceptualise child.  Lundy (2007) 
and Moss (2006) argue that the rights discourse of the past few decades, and specifically in the 
twentieth century, focused on rules and legislation made about children, exclusively in terms of their 
interests, through the lens of the adult.  There was an unarticulated and sometimes explicit 
understanding that children were subordinate to adults and, consequently, the focus was on legal rules 
pertaining to children’s lives, in particular pertaining to children’s rights.   
Moving, into the 21st century the rights discourse has changed with a number of advocates, such as 
John (2003) and Archard (2010) who have proposed that there is a need to examine children’s rights 
from a democratic perspective. This perspective views child in terms of adult acknowledging that child 
has autonomy and agency to recognize and realize that they have rights.  More importantly in this 
view, child experiences power, rather than being viewed as a powerless minority under the control of 
adult.  John suggests that “Children’s rights and power in the 21st century’s focus should embrace their 
aspirations, dreams and untrammelled imaginations, not their needs and deficits” (John, 2003, p. 49).  
This quote recognizes child as a person with rights and with the power to make decisions; this is in 
direct contrast to the view of child in the traditional schooling system, which is based on 
developmental theories and perpetuates deficit models of practice (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
6.3.2 Liberal View 
 
In light of the above, as a liberal discourse, children’s rights are often framed with an awareness that 
child is a future adult, adult being the source of legitimacy.  Thus, a rights discourse articulates and 
subscribes to the recognition that children are future adults, and therefore, citizens in the making.  
John, (2003, p. 17) would question this notion that suggests that children’s rights are enshrined as 
being legitimate, only because they serve the purpose of [children] on the path towards adulthood.  
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Her work interrogates whether there is a “contemporary crisis in childhood or whether an 
acknowledgement of children as powerful individuals has precipitated a crisis in power relationships in 
a contemporary world”.  John (2003) draws attention to the need to re-examine children’s rights in 
relation to a new body of thought, which centres the argument on the nature of power and presents 
child with new challenges for recognizing and realising his/her own agency and autonomy.  Roche 
(1999) advocated that children are taking responsibilities in a range of contexts. However, he argues, 
similarly to John (2003), that they are often rendered silent and invisible through attitudes and 
practices of adult society. 
Research undertaken by Ennew (1995) suggests that “modern childhood constructs the child out of the 
society, mutes their voices, denies their personhood and limits their potential” (Ennew, 1995, p. 25). I 
find this argument crucial to my research focus, as adult has in fact constructed child who does not 
have any power to be heard. The argument reinforces the assumption that adult needs to protect child 
in a world that is often a dangerous place for children.  Child is therefore a vulnerable being who needs 
the protection of adult to navigate through this dangerous territory.  Child is thus seen as powerless 
and unable to control or exercise power.  Adult therefore constructs child through problematising 
discourses such as dysfunction and deficit, (which has been covered in the section on developmental 
psychology).  This is also expressed in children’s rights discourse, especially in the early evolution of 
children’s rights, which focussed on protection, and viewed child according to adult bias.  The UNCRC 
heralded a new paradigm in shaping rights that encouraged adult to move beyond scientific objectivity 
and rigid notions, and to move towards more innovative and relevant policy making with regards to 
acknowledgment of children’s rights. 
From a children’s rights perspective, the value of acknowledging child as a person with power and 
agency is crucial to how we conceptualise childhood.  On many levels- social, emotional, economic, 
political and historical- and throughout this research a common thread is drawn that child is often 
situated as powerless, marginalized, abstracted and silenced from debates.   
Policies and Conventions (UNCRC, 1989; EWP6, 2001) suggest child should be included. However, in 
many instances there is a practice of exclusion of child’s voice rather than inclusion, when matters of 
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legal and moral rights of child are often ignored or decided upon by adults who believe they are acting 
in the best interests of child.  Child‘s voice is often excluded from the public world such as school and 
legal institutions in the name of protection or welfare of child.  Feminist writers suggest that this is due 
to the structure of families which are dominated by males.  They develop this argument further, stating 
that the subservient status of child is linked historically to that of women’s status in society.   As 
women were regarded as subservient, children too, were not afforded rights or equal status in society. 
On the other hand, Coles, cited in Roche, (1999) argues that the moral and reasoning capacities of 
children are as sophisticated as those of many adults. Roche, (1999) argues that if modern society 
views child as not separate from adult based on cognitive ability, then on what basis do we deny 
children participation in the communities to which they belong?  He suggests that in order to justify 
practices regarding child, an interrogation of the practices that exclude child from rights to 
participation needs to be on the agenda for rigorous debate.  There needs to be a shift from traditional 
notions of how we deal with children in terms of rights “which are predicated on a denial of their 
intelligence and agency” (Roche, 1999, p. 482). 
This call to acknowledge the rights of the child is made through an examination of literature, and 
through the evidence on the absence of acknowledgement of children’s rights, in terms of the focus on 
voice, and situating this voice in school contexts. It provides a basis on which to examine assumptions 
as to how child is conceptualised, and provides arguments as to why including child’s voice is crucial to 
policy-making and matters that have a direct influence on children’s lives. 
6.4 Philosophical Underpinnings of Children’s Rights 
 
Philosophers have continued to debate whether children should have rights at all and if so, what the 
nature and value of such rights is and how these rights intertwine with the moral status of children. 
The reason for this criticism is in the formation of rights, as in some instances rights drawn up by the 
United Nations Convention are legislated, whereas others are underpinned by moral theory.   
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Discussions of child’s rights underpin debates around the autonomy of children.  The issue of 
autonomy is referred to in Archard’s discussion of two contrasting schools of thought that emerge, 
namely, child liberationist and liberal caretaking theories (Archard, 2010).  From a child liberationist 
perspective, a stance is taken that a child should hold the same rights as adults.  Supporters of this 
theory claim that the separating of child and adult is not a natural phenomenon, but it is formed by 
historical, social, and cultural factors.  This notion would support the claim made by Aries (1960) that 
there was no conception of child during the Middle Ages (as discussed in Chapter2).   It would seem 
that in the current educational landscape, questions are still raised as to whether child should have the 
same rights as adults(akin to liberationists), or whether child needs protection and guidance from adult 
when making decisions regarding matters that affect him/her (akin to liberal caretaking theorists). 
6.4.1 Child Liberationist Views 
 
 Child Liberationists argue that basing conceptions of childhood on the assumption that it is socially 
constructed, categorizes or makes distinctions between adult and child, and suggests that it is child 
liberationist views child as capable of possessing two types of rights (Holt cited in Archard, 2010).  The 
first type of right are  those of protection “which guarantee[s] children certain forms of treatment,  for 
instance, a minimum standard of health care, education and freedom from violence and cruelty” 
(Archard, 2010, p. 47; Article 3 UNCRC, 1989).  Secondly, liberationists argue that it is important to 
afford children rights to make choices.  They advocate that rights provide children with agency. 
However, this is rejected by rights advocates (akin to the Liberalist Caretaking theory) who suggest that 
children cannot be afforded the same rights as adult, as child is vulnerable and incapable of making 
choices or informed decisions without adult intervention.  The liberalist ideology believes that giving 
children rights and agency and acknowledging their interests will lead to a society where the voice of 
child is represented.  However, this ideology is open to critique. 
The Liberalist Caretaking theorists reject the Liberalist view of children’s rights which claims that child 
is in no position to make rational decisions in matters pertaining to his/her needs or choices.  Added to 
this is the strong argument that one cannot grant the same rights afforded to adult to child, because 
child does not possess the ability to make such decisions.  This paternalistic notion suggests that there 
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is a need for adult to be a caretaker as it is adult who possesses the cognitive capacities and he/she is 
thus able to guide the action and decisions of child.  Adults are constructed as the deliverers of rational 
thought and sound judgement. Adults are in a position to know the child, and their interests and needs 
well and it is under their care then, that they are able to act on behalf of child.  Archard (2010) claims 
that in this perspective, adults thus secure the conditions to enable protection of child, therefore child 
is viewed as possessing no self-agency. 
6.4.2 Child Liberationist and Liberal Caretaking Theories: the debate 
 
The complexity of these two arguments is more compelling when reviewed these theories through the 
lens of an educational context, in which it is important to consider areas where there is a strong need 
to encourage participation of child and to hear child’s voice.  Liberal caretakers will be of the opinion 
that children cannot make these decisions, as they are still developing the cognitive capabilities and 
rational thinking that adults possess (akin to Piaget’s theory of child development).  They would argue 
that very young children would find it difficult to obey rules and regulations in a social context that is 
new to them and, as they get older, they may have a better understanding of the notion of these rules 
and regulations.  Liberal caretakers would still hold the conviction that it is only through adult guidance 
and engagement in dialogue with adult, that children will be able to make responsible decisions.   
Child caretaking theorists do not consider avenues within the school context where there may already 
be opportunities for participation and hearing voice.  In some instances, children may be part of the 
decision-making process concerning school rules or codes of conduct.  Other areas where they may be 
represented is on school committees or they may be called upon to make decisions about issues such 
as uniforms or other areas where a school may be thinking of making changes.   
In some areas, such as curriculum development and policy- making procedures, there is no space for 
including child’s voice or participation. This is due to various constraints, one being that in many 
instances curricula and policies are drawn up by the dominant adults in positions of power and, in 
many instances, these policies and curricula are underpinned by political ideologies, as noted in the 
research, undertaken by Bickmore, (2001) and Howe & Covell, (2000) in various school contexts. The 
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recommendations from this research suggested that schools need to re-evaluate the hierarchical 
systems in place and focus on areas within the system that would enrich children’s participation.    In 
this example there are constraints that hamper participation and voice. Some policies and Conventions 
(EWP6, 2001; UNCRC, 1989) may suggest there is a need to listen to child’s voice. However, in 
implementation there may not be follow-through.  A child caretaking theory does not suggest that 
children should be given complete autonomy (as a liberationist will claim) as there is a belief that 
because children move through developmental stages which separate them from adult, they need 
adult protection because child is vulnerable and not yet competent to make decisions without 
guidance.  The liberationist theory moves this to the extreme, where it advocates absolute autonomy 
with regard to allowing children freedom to make decisions and to share the same rights as adults.  A 
liberationist theory would serve no function in a school context where there is domination by adult 
with regard to systems, rules, policies, and procedures.  
There are ‘cracks in the concepts’ of both these theories. The liberationist theory suggests that child 
has equal rights to adults and this may pose problems concerning rights pertaining to adults.  Another 
argument is that in order to protect child, adults may need to intervene or set boundaries around 
child’s participation.   
In light of the two opposing theories, it is difficult to decide as to which theory holds more value as a 
tool to enable children to exercise rights.   A child liberationist would argue that children need to free 
themselves from the traditional conceptions of childhood.  Through this liberationist movement it is 
believed that children need not only protection and welfare rights, but they should be afforded rights 
to self-agency.  I agree with the liberationist perspective in terms of recognising that there is a move to 
shift beyond traditional conceptions of childhood that tend to view child as incapable of making 
decisions.  “In essence, child liberationists sought to overturn the dominant ideology that equated 
children with incompetence and helplessness in order to help them realise their full potential and 
become more independent at an earlier stage in life.” (Jonny, 2006, p.7) 
Although the child liberationist argument has been considered and debated within scholarship it has 
been less successful in its implementation into practice in school contexts.  There are still attitudes of 
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adults in schools that do not acknowledge that child is a rational decision maker.  This conception of 
child as not being able to think rationally has excluded many children from decision-making or 
representation in matters that affect them in school.  Schools continue to operate by means of 
traditional and authoritative structures.  An area still in need of debate is the urgent call to examine 
the assumptions and conceptualization of child and his/her position in school contexts.  Moreover, 
many schools are still functioning as the dominant role- players in shaping what they deem is in the 
best interests of children which from a rights advocate perspective is unjust.  The UNCRC (1989) needs 
to be foregrounded as part of policy and curriculum development, to provide opportunities for the 
expression of child’s voice and to create more opportunities to develop children’s self-agency. 
To develop this argument further O’Neill (1998) argues that there is a need to think about the moral 
obligations that adults owe to children.  She draws the distinction between the perfect obligations, 
which specify that the rights given to all children or some specified set of children, and the moral 
obligations that adults hold with regard to upholding these rights.  Rights suggest that it is the 
obligation or duty of parents or educators to care for child and not abuse him/her in any way.  The 
argument raised by O’Neill is that in this regard all adults ought to acknowledge children’s rights. 
However, these rights are not owed to all children, as they will depend on the child’s circumstances. 
Perfect obligations are those that one person may demand of another; in this context, adult may 
demand child behave in such a way, or regard child as not being capable of understanding rights.  In 
contrast to this, she discusses the notion of imperfect obligations, which she claims do not relate to 
children’s rights.  Her argument expresses scepticism about the moral reasoning adults make in terms 
or their relationship to child.  Imperfect obligations are obligations that go beyond duty, as they oblige 
adult to exceed perfect obligations.  In terms of child’s voice, a duty or perfect obligation would be to 
include a child’s opinions and views in matters that may affect that child in terms of his/her schooling.  
But clearly, as individuals, we cannot assume that child’s voice is heard in all institutions by all 
stakeholders involved.   
Moreover, what adult ought to do, in cases of acknowledging child’s voice, may depend on 
circumstances, and also what is put in place by the particular institution and the laws, policies and 
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procedures upheld by the institution to acknowledge child’s voice.  It is apparent that the practice of 
speaking with children and listening to their voices is not widespread in educational contexts. 
In recent years there has been strong opposition to child caretaking and liberationist theories by 
advocates of children’s rights such as John (2003) and Archard (2010).  A vast array of literature has 
suggested that there is a strong justification for providing child with opportunities which may influence 
important decisions about plans or actions.  Modern conceptions of child regard them as citizens who 
have power and agency to safeguard their worlds and futures.   
A summary of these two theories bring issues to the surface which need careful consideration.  
Excluding child from the process of decision-making, even at a young age, may deny any insights from 
child that adults may previously have ignored.  Decision-making can be representational as adult may 
listen to child however, not take these matters into consideration when deciding on what is best for 
child in a situation (akin to Kate where I as adult made the decisions as regard to her intervention).  
Participation can thus include representation and decision-making, if child is given an opportunity to be 
heard and participate in decision-making then child’s rights will be acknowledged.  Adults, especially in 
school contexts should exercise the notion of deciding to what extent participation can occur and what 
opportunities can be provided to permit children to contribute, depending on their capabilities. 
Globally, there has been a strong acknowledgement that children should contribute to the world they 
inhabit (James & Prout, 1997; Jenks, 2010; Hart, 1991; Haynes, 2009; Stabels, 2008; Vansieleghem & 
Kennedy, 2011). With the drawing up of international agreements, such as the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the move towards giving child voice and participation in matters 
that affect them has transformed the way in which schools practice. However, as will be discussed 
below, the UNCRC (1989) has met with criticism.  The USA and Somalia are the only non-signatories of 
this Convention. 
6.5 Rights and Schools 
 
The UNCRC (1989) specifies social, cultural, economic and political rights.  The Convention states that 
parents and other legal guardians, including the State, should meet the social and economic needs of 
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the child. However, the shift in positioning child’s rights has come in the articles that provide child with 
the right to age-appropriate participation.  This turning point recognises that child can possesses 
rational thought to make judgements and allows for some autonomy as to how child can participate in 
decision- making processes. In this respect, there is a link to the liberationist view, as it promotes the 
political role of child. Even though there are liberationist foundations in the UNCRC, such as Article 326, 
which discusses the consideration of best interests of child, adult still restrict child’s rights.  The best 
interest principle has been tabled in many debates as a critique that adults still hold power over child 
when, deciding upon what is in the best interests of the child.  This raises a strong argument for adult 
interference over child autonomy.  Researchers such as Covell and Howe (2007) have noted “there is 
good reason to believe from the wording of the articles of the Convention, and from documents and 
debates leading up to the Convention, that the framers intended participation as an integral part of the 
best interests’ principle” (Covell and Howe, 2007 p.112).  The Convention thus acknowledges that child 
has a voice with which to make choices and, more importantly, to be able to voice concerns in matters 
affecting them. 
Research conducted by Alderson (2000) draws on opinions of conservative groups who claim that, 
despite the international ratification of the Convention, the participatory principle threatens the rights 
of adults because it is dangerous to acknowledge for child should be recognised as having too much 
autonomy.  This is the main argument for the USA not becoming a signatory.  It also influences the 
argument I have put forward strongly in this research, where child does not always have full 
participation of rights in institutions, such as schools, as educational policies and practices do not 
always reflect the statements made in the various articles that make up the (UNCRC,1989). 
                                                          
26
 Article 3 (UNCRC, 1990, p.1) www.2.ohchr.org  
1.  In all actions concerning children whether undertaken by public, or private social welfare institutions, courts of 
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.  
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his/her well-being, taking 
into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other persons legally responsible for 
him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. 
3. States parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of 
children shall conform to all standards established by competent authorities, particularly in areas of safety, health, 
in the n umber and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision. 
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Schools are, in a sense, government institutions (private schools have to follow legislated Acts; for 
example, (The South African Schools Actn84 of 1996).  South Africa is a signatory of the Convention and 
therefore ought to be developing policy and curricula based on these international principles.  Raising 
questions as to how to utilize the Convention of rights in institutions, especially schools, is important.  
Incorporating these rights into policies (such as the new CAPS documents recently implemented in the 
Foundation Phase 2012 and to be implemented into the intermediate and senior phases in 2013) 
should be a priority of policy-makers, curriculum developers, and schools.  Although, the UNCRC (1989) 
is acknowledged, it is not always legally binding. There is a strong argument from advocates to use the 
articles to inform educational policies and practices (Johnny, 2006; Lewis, 2007; Lundy, 2007; Mannion, 
2007; Morrow, 1999; Moss, 2006). 
In summary, it is important for schools to be aware that child possesses rights, especially concerning 
matters that affect them. The transformation in the South African schooling system since 1994 should 
be at the forefront of policies and practice.  This transformation reflects a move from the segregation 
and marginalisation of children to a more democratically equitable system, underpinned by social 
justice and human rights that, legitimises the importance for children to be rights holders. 
Policies, such as the White Paper 6 Special Needs Education: Building an Inclusive Education and 
Training System (DoE, 2001), have made efforts to uphold these rights within the documents and 
policies. However, schools and educational systems continue to perpetuate inequalities of the past 
system and to exclude rather than to include.  The notion of including children’s participatory rights in 
schools remains problematic and erratic. Researchers have highlighted that there are numerous 
challenges when implementing these UNCRC principles in practice.  Howe & Covell,(2000) discuss the 
issues faced in schools when upholding participatory rights of children, especially in schools where 
rules and structures are dominated by adult decisions. Bickmore,(2001) draws on the issue of power 
relations in classrooms where children have no opportunities to express their views.    Thus, a critical 
argument exists that if schools continue to operate according to hegemonic structures that produce 
rules and policies that are dominated by adult power, then the principles upheld in the UNCRC (1989) 
may not reach the intended goals of the Convention. How do schools develop practices that allow for 
meaningful participation?  In doing so, how aware is child of his/her rights and responsibilities?  
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Pedagogies such as P4C and Critical pedagogies (footnote 22) where there are moves towards more 
democratic practices and where there is provision made to allow for child to voice opinions and share 
in decision-making concerning matters affecting their lives, need to be implemented.   
Schools and stakeholders have to be accountable for upholding these rights and examine their own 
responsibilities in this regard.  How do we integrate school practice and the UN Convention of the 
Rights of the Child?  These notions are too broad to discuss in this research report.  I will be indicating 
this as an area to include in a further study.   
Another important critique in the rights discourse points to the individual autonomy within many 
debates about children’s rights, as the rights discourse has evolved with changing conceptions of 
childhood, whereby theories such as sociologies of childhood and philosophy of childhood are urging 
that child be viewed as an autonomous human being. The children’s right movement has thus 
motivated for a propensity of individualisation. It is felt that individualisation would make society 
aware of children’s worth rather than separating them as a marginalised group.  This motivation is 
based on the premise that if child is viewed as an autonomous individual then more acknowledgement 
of child’s capabilities will be executed in policies and practice. 
The desirability of this motivation towards viewing child as autonomous has met with opposition.  
Writers such as Freeman (2007) and Aitken (2001) have warned of the potential risks involved if 
children’s rights are based on autonomy and individualisation.  Their arguments raise the issue that 
autonomy and participation rights may blur social conceptualisations of child.  Morrow, (1999) argues 
that if rights are equated with individualism, a too-dichotomous representation of children’s rights will 
be foregrounded, highlighting differences in children’s cultural backgrounds. 
Another criticism of individualistic rights is its link to universality.  A universal notion of rights does not 
take different cultural beliefs into account, but assumes all children are equal.  From a cultural relativist 
view, it would be seen that all cultures are of equal value and that conceptions of childhood would only 
make sense within the cultures to which they belong.  An individualistic view grounds a person’s rights 
in what it does for that person, independent of how rights serve or disserve the child’s wider 
community and, in turn, this notion overlooks cultural diversity.  Thus different people will hold 
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different biases which may be individualistically justified in that culture. Individualistic notions stifle 
child’s exposure to the opinions and views of others.  In terms of schooling, collaborative learning will 
be discouraged and individualistic goals such as competitiveness and social skills needed for interaction 
will not be viewed as central to learning.   
The criticism that individualistic notions stifle child’s exposure to the opinions and views of others has a 
profound effect upon inclusion of child’s voice in matters that affect them.  I suggest that one vehicle 
that could begin to expose child to different views and opinions is through a Philosophy for Kids(P4C) 
programme.  The ethos of the P4C is based on Deweyian philosophical ideas that suggest education 
ought to be based on democracy autonomy, a rights capacity, and a willingness to engage with others.  
The collaborative ethos of doing philosophy with children is premised on an acknowledgement of 
rights and responsibility to engage with others in order for individuals (child) to grow.  In this way, child 
realises that there must be mutual adaptation when working within a community of enquiry. In a 
community of enquiry child is encouraged to engage in dialogue, which often contains concepts that 
are philosophical in nature and linked to children’s rights. Concepts such as human rights, respect, 
value, solidarity and inclusion are ideas that are often brought into the discussions based on the stimuli 
used in a community of enquiry.  Throughout the process of engagement in a community of enquiry, 
issues are often discussed that lead child to engage with ideas, justifications and arguments for 
fostering citizenship and democratic values. 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have considered childhood and children’s rights from an historical and 
philosophical perspective.  I have presented an argument for child as active participant in society and 
for children’s empowerment in the educational system.  Who really does know what is best when it 
comes to the education of child?  Liberationists claim that the autonomous child should have a say in 
matters with regard to their education.  Protectionists argue that child is incompetent to make 
decisions and it is therefore up to the adult to make decisions.   Children are often viewed through 
protectionist lenses, who argue that child needs protection as they develop the skills to become 
competent decision-makers learning to exercise sound judgement. Archard (2010) challenges this 
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protectionist notion claiming that it is often adults who are in a position to protect children who may, 
in fact, end up abusing them.  
 Pragmatists believe it is crucial to strike a balance between protection and self-determination    when 
considering child’s views Archard (2010).  A pragmatist argument suggests that a balance should be 
created between liberationist and protectionist ideas. This view is supported by Hart (1991) who 
maintains that striking a balance between these two ideas recognises the protection needed for 
children, whilst at the same time allows for the acknowledgment of child’s emerging knowledge. 
The response to who knows what is best for the child is not the central issue.  It rests more on the 
notion of giving a child a voice and considering the individual needs of the child.  The ethical and legal 
implications of the concept of best interests of the child has become problematic, and many 
researchers have critiqued this concept as being vague and open to manipulation by adults who hold 
the power over decisions made with regard to child’s best interests.  Furthermore, if consultation with 
children disregards individuality, it may disempower and tokenise child, rather than respect or consider 
child’s voice.  Exclusion of child’s voice in decision-making and participation may result in child feeling 
undervalued. 
Providing children with opportunities to participate in decision-making, and encouraging their 
contributions will facilitate communication between adult and child, and allow child to be a participant 
in matters that affect him/her.  Educators can become advocates in encouraging child’s voice in 
educational contexts since they are in close contact with child on an everyday basis. 
In conclusion, perceptions of the child as incompetent when it comes to matters that affect them need 
to be changed, especially in the domain of education.  Children are not becomings or persons in the 
making that adults can treat how they like, but they are human beings with a voice.  Adults need to 
respect children’s views and facilitate the need for them to be given a right to express their voices.  
Through participation and consultation, a space is encouraged for child’s voice to be heard without 
handing child the responsibility to make an autonomous decision, which they may not be ready to 
make.  In respecting the notion that each child is an individual, with his/her own needs and voice, 
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adults need to collaborate and communicate to determine the individual child’s competence, by 
listening to his/her views and respecting those views. 
Thus, a rights-based framework shifts thinking in terms of moving away from the risk of essentialising 
childhood.  A strong argument from advocates of children’s rights is that a recognition and 
acknowledgement of a child’s right to be heard may reflect the beginnings of a reconceptualization of 
childhood.  The strongest critique has been the failure to interrogate the meaning of child and 
childhood.  Rights, in many instances, still define the concept child as having universal meaning and still 
in a phase of developing. These universal accounts of development of child offer a plausible argument 
for acknowledging rights, but they also have limitations.  They fail to consider the diversities of child’s 
experiences, including ways in which child learns, communicate and understands his/her world.  
Cultural backgrounds and the diverse ways in which child is treated in different communities oppose 
the universal accounts of development. There is a need to look beyond these universal accounts that 
normalise child and childhood via a standardised notion of development. 
 
Chapter Seven   
Conclusion: Fragments of an endless conversation on childhood 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The title for my conclusion has been borrowed from the title of a paper penned by Kohan and Kennedy 
(2008). The reason for my choosing this title is that it describes the progression I have made and the 
challenges I have stumbled upon, whilst penning my own thoughts and arguments. 
The title “Fragments of an endless conversation on childhood” epitomises my own trajectory as I was 
immersed in a topic that is so broad and which crosses over into so many domains.  It was difficult, at 
times, to narrow down this “endless conversation on childhood” and the more I read, the more difficult 
it was to stay bounded in terms of my central focus: child’s voice. 
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The concept “fragments” used in the paper’s title describes the number of ‘fragments’ I encountered in 
the scholarly literature, and the discomfort I experienced in deciding which fragments to discard and 
which ones to retain. At times, I was unable to discern which areas of childhood to include and where, 
in fact, I was heading with my research.   
This endless conversation on childhood began to dominate this research report and, with some 
reservation, I had to make the decision to narrow the scope.  I realise that I have only touched the 
surface of childhood, its complexities and its theoretical impact on education.  I have also begun the 
conversation of including child’s voice in practice, and plan to take this into further research. 
Unexpectedly, I was confronted with so much to read on childhood and child’s voice and was exposed 
to this multitude of different voices in my investigations of including child’s voice, that I was able, 
simply, to highlight the complexities involved in listening to child’s voice.  In many instances policies, 
and school mission statements acknowledge that children have the right to express their ideas or 
concerns.  However, many of these calls to include child’s voice are cosmetic or become tokenistic.  
Adult is still the knower, who in some instances dominates the inclusion of child’s voice.  Once again, 
the argument is drawn to the ways in which we listen to child and how child is defined according to 
adult.  Opportunities need to be fostered in order to listen to and to include child’s voice. This is the 
reason I argued that through pedagogical practices and programmes such as Philosophy for Children 
(P4C) spaces can be created through dialogue and democratic ideals that respect child as a citizen, able 
to negotiate and voice ideas and concerns. I have argued that there needs to be in a shift in power 
where adult’s role changes from that of the expert to the facilitator; however, this does not mean that 
adult does not play an important role - in fact, this role becomes crucial in order to empower child’s 
voice. 
7.2  Adult-Child: Including Voice 
 
The conceptual framework for empowering child’s voice suggested by  Hadfield and Haw in Thomson, 
(2008) which defines voice as made of critical elements, namely, ‘authoritative ’, ‘critical’ ‘therapeutic’ 
and ‘pedagogic’ voice, allowed me to explore the concept of ‘voice’ in a much deeper way, as it opened 
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up another perspective on how we should relate to and engage with child.  These different elements of 
voice allowed me draw on my own experiences in working with children and to examine critically how I 
positioned myself within this relationship.  I acknowledge that much more work in terms of research 
would need to be done to determine how educators might consider child’s multiple voices within a 
school context. 
These voices with different slants and perspectives, made me take notice of the many unquestioned 
and contested notions of childhood. Moreover, it allowed me to examine the assumptions and 
problematic issues that are continually addressed in current literature and the growing number of 
different perspectives that have been published in this area.  It also settled the discomfort I felt whilst 
writing, in the sense that I realised that the scope of my research was limited and I thus had to choose 
to map the relevant philosophies.  
Returning to the paper which is structured as an interview between Kohan and Kennedy, they discuss 
the essence of questions such as “What is child?” and “What is childhood?” and I would not be able to 
sum up my trajectory without quoting Kohan’s words. 
Kohan in his discussion with Kennedy (2008, p. 10)27 argues that “childhood might be, not just an 
activity of questioning but a specific kind of relationship to questions, that opens up the questioner to 
a movement that he or she cannot control or anticipate”.  He problematizes the distinction between 
adult-child, by suggesting that adult can be childlike in its exposure to questioning. I, as the questioner 
throughout this research, was positioned as the novice entering a domain that I could not always 
control or anticipate and it was in this experience, of ups and downs, reconstruction and revisions, that 
I gained so much as a researcher. 
7.3  A summary of the arguments 
 
A number of questions arose as I gathered my thoughts and arguments.  I argued that developmental 
psychology has dominated current educational practice and claimed also, that as adults, we feel a 
                                                          
27
 The paper” Fragments of an endless conversation”, is structured as a discussion between Walter Kohan and David 
Kennedy.  
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certain need to control or protect child as authorities or protectors.   However, there are differences 
between adult and child.  As adult, are we able to understand child’s world?  As adults we act, plan and 
negotiate a route through a child’s life.  Adults, too, were once children and in many instances still hold 
onto childhood memories and experiences. “Is childhood something we leave behind?” (Friquenon, 
1997; Kennedy, 2000; Kohan, 1999). However, I have come to the realisation that even though 
childhood is a profound part of the human condition, it is largely unexamined or in many cases, taken 
for granted.  If childhood is a biological fact, then why are there so many complexities and 
contradictions as one begins to think more deeply about its conceptions?   
Developmental psychology and its notions of child development have been criticized widely for 
assumptions based on universal characteristics and stages of development.  Nevertheless, these 
theories still remain dominant in our understandings of child development and the way in which we 
deal with child.  This idea of fixed and rigid stages is questionable, as has been discussed in this 
research. 
In schooling contexts and in areas of educator training, the emphasis on studies of childhood 
constitutes a normative discourse.  Institutions such as universities, training educators, still accentuate 
studies of childhood based upon major theorists, such as Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky, whose theories 
are infused in courses on childhood development and educational psychology.  In this regard, child is 
viewed as a universal concept, standardised across the different discourses, whereas the study of child 
is far more complex.  If there is a continued trend to work with child within this framework and 
conceptions of child remains uncontested, then there can be no opportunities created to listen to and 
include child’s voice or rights, other than in a superficial or tokenistic manner. 
The contradictions within theories of childhood have led me to challenge assumptions I held and I have 
shifted the way in which I view child.  On the one hand, child is familiar and at the same time unknown.  
Incidents occur in which we as adults assume child to be just like us and similarly, we perceive them to 
be as living in a completely different world to adults.   
 Writers of childhood theories tend to write from which perspective informs their idea of what 
childhood is like, while psychologists tend to view child as limited, in that child knows less than adult.  
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Philosophers of childhood have argued that long before children can read or write they have 
extraordinary powers to engage in conversations that demand abstract thought and creativity. In a 
number of instances, as posited by writers in the domain of philosophy of childhood, child experiences 
the world in ways that are far more wide-ranging than adult.   Through different scholarly lenses such 
as developmental psychology, these experiences may be viewed as being more limited yet concrete.  
As argued through the selected literature these ideas and conceptions we have of child spring up from 
hegemonic Western perspectives. Critiques from philosophers of childhood argue that this hegemony 
needs to be reconceptualised, and assumptions examined, in order to acknowledge child as a being, 
rather than to accept perceptions that socialise child as an object or a becoming. 
We are left with a number of important questions such as adults were once children, how do these 
experiences of childhood position us as adults? The notion of change influences conceptions of child 
and childhood and how we imagine ourselves as part of this changing world.  We can view child using 
ideas from psychology, philosophy, anthropology and sociology, yet are we able to answer questions 
adequately about the ‘inner’ lives of children, or is this a fragment of an endless conversation?  Are we 
able to tap into the ‘inner’ lives of children, and acknowledge that children construct the world 
differently or see the world in different ways to adults?  If we ignore child’s voice and continue to 
implement policies that restrict participation or child’s views on matters that affect them, are we 
respecting child as a being, or viewing child as a becoming?   
An analogy described by Blommaert (2005) in his book entitled Discourse, describes a Coke can that is 
positioned in the centre of a table.  Blommaert describes people positioning themselves at different 
places around the table.  Each person sees the can from a different point of view, whether remaining in 
one position or moving around to another position.  This Coke can, could be perceived as child, and the 
people viewing the can from different positions, the diverse and often conflicting conceptions that 
attempt to define child and childhood through the lenses of the different discourses, which are often 
conflicting, blurred and contested. The people positioned at the table, could be representative of the 
dissemination of different viewpoints.  From each different position, there are different fragments of 
childhood that are problematic or unquestioned.  Different conversations from multiple voices 
representing their concepts and conceptions of child and child’s voice will emanate from each person’s 
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unique view of the child or from the different domains of sociology of child, anthropology, history, 
developmental psychology and philosophy of child. A question that still remains unanswered: is it 
possible to make childhood the ‘object’ of study, as aren’t we ourselves as adults in a profound sense 
also child?   
Is it possible to invite children to sit around the table and explore the ‘can’ (child)?  Would this be an 
implication of what it means to include child’s voice?  Mary John refers to this invitation by articulating 
the importance of child if considered as a ‘powerful member of society’ (John, 2003).  Her work has 
attempted to demonstrate the importance of adult recognising child as a person.  If child is invited to 
sit around the table, what questions would arise and how would adult react?  John (2003) suggests 
that adult-child relationships have been composed around an ‘as if’ relationship.  In this sense, child is 
thus not seen as a person who experiences power.  If child was the Coke can in the analogy, linking this 
to what it means to include child’s voice could be two-fold; firstly, if adult adopts the stance that child 
is powerless, then there is a need to ask why children are rarely included in debates on social 
accountability. Secondly, if we examine children’s rights in relation to the nature of power, and how 
power is determined by adult-child relationships, and on a broader level, by culture and economics, 
then potential debates open up in presenting child in a different light.  Child, in this sense will thus be 
recognised as having rightful agency and autonomy. If child was given a voice at this table, would this 
voice be acknowledged in terms of the child’s “deficits and needs” or would it embrace his/her “hopes 
and aspirations” of child’s dreams? (John, 2003, p.19).  
7.4  Towards a definition of childhood 
 
Pinning down a precise definition of childhood is impossible since children’s experiences have varied, 
not only throughout history (Aires, 1962), but also in contemporary society.  Childhood for an Aids 
orphan in Africa is a very different experience from that of a child growing up in a more ‘developed’ 
country.  In a South African context, experiential differences can vary in the same area: growing up as a 
street child in Johannesburg is in stark contrast to a child growing up in a suburban JHB household.  
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 Different notions of childhood bring different issues to the debates. In some instances, literature has 
shed light on the innocence and vulnerability of children. Other literature gives substance to the rights 
of children and affirmation that child’s voice ought to be considered in matters that affect his/her life.    
The rights discourse challenges adult as much as child.  Respecting and acknowledging these rights 
changes the way in which adults think about themselves and child.   As has been argued, the children’s 
rights discourse is still a contested issue amongst many researchers and child rights activists.   
Conceptions of child and rights discourse cannot be seen in isolation.  There are intersections on many 
levels such as the political, social, cultural, economic and historical. As has been discussed, the 
emphasis on autonomy in child rights discourse has raised concerns, especially in non-Western 
countries.  Cultural conventions in these countries are based on inter-dependence, rather than the 
Western notion of individuality.   A number of authors used in this research have indicated that 
different rights may foreground others, or be understood differently depending on the political, social 
and economic contexts of different societies.  Rights also impact on the everyday lives of children, at 
home, school and in societies.  Adult-child relationships are an important part of the rights discourse.  
How adult views child, through cultural and political ideologies, will affect the way with which child is 
dealt.  The role of adult comes into question in terms of how child responds to adult and how adults 
treat child.  Adults’ own experiences of childhood may influence the way in which child may be listened 
to.  Child’s relationships with other children may also influence the way in which child engages with 
his/her world.  Childhood and conceptions of child are relevant in engaging with the children’s rights 
discourse.  A central theme was therefore to explore ways in which including child’s voice may or 
ought to change children’s lives and the way in which adults deal with them.  Rights discourse and 
debates are still emerging and there has been an important transition in problematizing attitudes and 
assumptions and moving towards linking children’s rights to their lived experiences. 
 Burman (2008) emphasises that normative conceptualizations of children are differentiated from 
other children, according to development as being competent or not competent.  I believe there is a 
strong argument for acknowledging child’s voice. If there is no listening to voice then exclusionary 
practices, are continually perpetuated, rather than including of child’s voice in decisions that affect 
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him/her. Indeed, the presence or absence of voice has led to numerous arguments and critiques from 
children’s rights advocates. 
7.5 My own voice in practice 
 
In view of the literature with which I have engaged, I am beginning to realise that conceptions of child 
extend beyond my previous grounding in developmental psychology. The works of contemporary 
philosophers such as Archard (2010); Kennedy (2000); Matthews (1996);  and Stables, (2008), argue for 
an urgent move to destabilise the domination of conceptions of child as powerless that is currently 
positioned in schooling.  
Burman’s work, in particular, has provided the springboard from which I have begun to interrogate and 
investigate my assumptions of how I view and work with child. It has derailed me from my previous 
stance and identity as a practitioner and has created an uncomfortable contradiction within my own 
practice.  The question of how to include child provides a critical introduction as to how researchers 
and practitioners, like myself, have come to “understand mainstream accounts of developmental 
psychology in their contexts” (Burman, 2008).  Burman suggests that there is a need to view 
developmental psychology critically and thereby force educators to think through and reflect on their 
assumptions about child and the consequences of “existing critiques” (Burman,2008, p.6) 
In my experience of working with children, I relate to back to the critical incident with Kate, to which I 
referred in Chapter One. In many instances, I made decisions as according to what I expected from 
children during the interventions and, more importantly, in directing the conversations I had with 
them. Kate’s voice, in particular, had a profound impact on my practice and deepened my realisation 
that I was not in fact hearing child’s voice or acknowledging her as a person with power.   
Reflecting on Hadfield and Haw’s (in Thomson,2008) categories of voice, in this instance, I was 
speaking from a therapeutic voice, in that I was assuming that what I was doing with regards to this 
intervention was in Kate’s best interests.  I was also using my pedagogical voice to decide on which 
interventions were valid.  In doing so, these voices did not open a space for acknowledging and 
listening to her voice.  My authoritative voice suggests that I spoke on behalf of Kate by not involving 
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her in the intervention process.  I was considering Kate’s ‘epistemological and practical voices’ rather 
than acknowledging her own critical voice. 
Dahlberg and Moss (2005, p.99), drawing on  Rinaldi’s work, claim that “Listening is a metaphor for 
having an openness and sensitivity to listen and be listened to… listening is not just with our ears, but 
with all our senses…listening does not just produce answers but formulates questions”. In this 
example, I did not acknowledge that Kate had a voice of her own.   
My assumption in working with Kate was that I thought I was being open and sensitive to her needs. In 
retrospect, I was ignoring her experience and had not acknowledged her own voice. This experience 
links to ideas posited by Dewey’s creative democratic ideal, as he believed that democracy forces 
observation of the existence of common interests.  I, as the adult, was not observing or considering 
Kate’s voice in a democratic way, but rather ignoring this democratic ideal by not acknowledging the 
existence of common interests. Dewey’s claim, which is similar to that of Vygotsky’s, proposed that 
language is the most important tool in the process of creating meaning.  In this regard, dialogue, talk 
and face-to face-interaction lies at the core of Dewey’s idea of democracy.  He argued that in order to 
obtain this social intelligence, which he believed was not innate in humans, education steps in to 
bridge this gap between social intelligence and democracy.  This creative democratic ideal positions 
child’s voice as a central component, as it encourages child to think for him/ herself in the process of 
enquiry.  Dewey’s principles of “open mindness” advocated that “free expression of thought and the 
experimental use of intelligence are secured” (Dewey, 1927, p. 365).  Furthermore, he claimed that 
“each individual has an intrinsic worth and value” (Dewey, 1927, p. 365).  Thus, Dewey’s ideal aim of 
education centres on the idea of human self-realisation.  He argued that education was vital for 
humans, as it was through conscious and free communication that intellectual ability was developed.  
Education seen thus, implies a continuous transaction between self and the environment.  Even if 
educational contexts and policies do not regard child’s voice as important, the crucial point is that 
researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners need to challenge these ideas pertaining to including 
child’s voice and more importantly, question whether educational contexts that set rules and policies 
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can apply exceptions to these, when it comes to including and listening to child’s voice.  Moreover, in a 
democratic schooling context, this notion of voice should be paramount. 
Furthermore, in my work with children in small groups and individual contexts, I came to the 
realisation that in many ways, I as adult, was not ‘entering’ child’s world. I dominated the relationship 
of adult-child, in that, the expectations I carried, were all interventions that measured set outcomes 
and progress.  I designed the materials and taught the support strategies without considering how 
child was experiencing the process.  
 I am beginning to question whether how I listened hampered, rather than encouraged, expression of child’s  
voice.  By placing emphasis, on my power as an adult, I did not step back and provide for opportunities 
 for child to be a social agent in this process.  I am not certain if the way in which I operated in terms of 
 listening to child’s voice took into account child’s rights and, more importantly, included child’s voice.  
In this regard, I, as the audience, was not listening to the views of the child, nor was I creating space for  
Child to express a view. It was my influence that was shaping the outcome of my interventions. 
7.6 My position now as I reflect on the shifts in my own thinking 
 
Reflecting on my own practice and the literature on voice and listening, I have definitely broadened my 
knowledge in terms of situating the concept of listening into social and political spheres.  Listening is a 
powerful key in a participatory democratic society.  Alongside this is the current discourse on children’s 
rights, which will be discussed below, that places child in a position to be heard and listened to.  The 
impact of this rights discourse has been a foundation on which I have begun to explore how effectively 
adult could listen to child and consult with them.  Listening to child may not be a comfortable process, 
given that assumptions of difference are visible and opinions and beliefs of adult may vary.  From my 
experiences there have been times when uncomfortable situations lead to a resistance or shutdown 
rather than opening up responsive listening.    
7.7 Reflections 
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This research has brought up many questions and assumptions in need of further investigation.  The 
limitations of this research were that a number of issues covering this vast topic were not able to be 
included.  I started this research considering how child and childhood is conceptualised and 
represented in sociology of childhood, philosophy of childhood and developmental psychology, and 
touched on some of the arguments and assumptions that have continued to be written about in 
literature. 
This research has left  many significant questions unanswered, questions that have been raised in 
various discourses such as children’s rights, the adult-child dichotomy, the complex conceptualisations 
of child according to culture, social context and political ideology.  In many instances, I have drawn the 
conclusion that in many aspects of child’s life, child is still seen as vulnerable and as an adult-in-the 
making, rather than as an individual with capabilities and a ‘voice’.  There has been a move towards 
including child’s voice, specifically with regards to the rights discourse, but there is still a long road to 
travel in acknowledging that child is capable of making decisions that affect his/her schooling and in 
actual representation in policies drawn up by educational institutions. 
The tasks of reconceptualising child, deconstructing developmental psychology and the interwoven 
links with human biology, ethics, moral, political and social issues, remains an issue on the agenda of all 
who attempt to ‘enter’ a child’s world.   
The notion of entering a child’s world is complex, as it is adult who has defined and created childhood.  
Adult defines child, as adults prefer to define themselves.  Child is described with attributes which are 
‘childlike’ or ‘immature’ as they are not regarded as adult.  There is a difficulty in adult shifting 
perceptions and thinking in terms of the adult-child dichotomy.  Entering a child’s world may mean 
observing the daily practices of children in their school contexts and including their voices by 
acknowledging they are capable citizens of the world, rather than by abstracting child as a universal 
concept that is part and parcel of an adult dominated society and thus having to comply with adult in 
all aspects of their lives.  Adult in dominant position may not always engage  with realities of children’s 
lives and contexts. 
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7.8 Limitations 
 
The main limitation of this study has been the bounded space within the constructs of a Masters 
Research report.  Given that I chose a very complex and vast topic, it was difficult to decide what to 
leave in and focus on for the development of an argument and what areas to exclude. 
The literature involving children’s rights discourse, children’s voices, philosophy of childhood and 
developmental psychology is immense.  I selected the key authors from each discourse that I felt would 
cement my argument; however, I acknowledge that there are a multitude of authors in the domains 
that I have referred to, whom I had to leave out. I therefore focussed on a few authors in depth and 
skimmed the surface of the many that could not be included. 
This study was conceptual in structure and therefore I did not have data to analyse or discuss. Thus my 
argument was based on an analyses and critique of the concepts, child and childhood, child’s voice and 
children’s rights. 
7.9 Further Research 
 
In this research I have merely opened up the ‘Coke can’ and taken a small sip.  I would consider 
furthering these ideas that I have worked with and would move from theory to praxis in completing an 
ethnographic study on how educators conceptualise child and childhood. From this I would be able to 
use these perceptions to broaden the assumptions adults bring into their educational contexts, as it is 
their perceptions and assumptions that create the child with which they deal in their classrooms and 
this impedes or facilitates the inclusion of child’s voice.  What has led me to envision this further study 
is the important notion that how a community constructs the notion of childhood and the child is 
fundamentally embodied in the practices and policies of that community.  I have come to realise 
throughout my reading that if conceptions of child and childhood are left as uncontested notions, then 
educational contexts and policies will remain representational of normative values and views of child. 
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This research has shown there is a strong body of literature that is calling for alternative constructions 
of child and childhood.  A repositioning of child and how child is defined in terms of legislation, policies 
and practices has the root of this research.  In the words of Malaguzzi: 
Our image of children no longer considers them as isolated or egocentric… 
       does not belittle feelings or what is not logical…Instead our image of the 
                     child is rich in potential, strong, powerful, competent and most of all, connected 
                                 to adults and other children.  (Malaguzzi, in Hall, 2010, p. 10) 
 
The National Education Department in South Africa has been committed to reshaping and revising 
policies and practices in Early Childhood Development.  As the South African government and 
education department are moving through this period of change, there are still many challenges to 
work through, touching on political, ethical and socio-economic dimensions.  As part of this 
transformation process, many educators have been trained and are continuing to be trained so as to 
build a strong foundation for children entering the first phase of their education.  A study that 
examines constructions of childhood and their impact on pedagogy and policy through the eyes of the 
educators involved at this level of education is a suggested follow-on from this study. 
What has made me consider further research in the domain of Early Childhood Development, is the 
different and ever-changing views on the study of childhood that I was exposed to in reading for this 
research report.  I have been drawn to the ideas that these views of childhood have an impact on the 
implications for early childhood practice, in considering is important for children to be exposed to in 
their early schooling contexts. More fascinating for me is how different models of child as a learner 
impact on pedagogic practice. 
7.9.1  The broader significance of my research 
 
In answering my research question “What does it mean to include child’s voice in educational 
contexts?” I am considering the potential implications of this conceptual research for others in relation 
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to conceptions of child, child’s voice, deconstructing developmental psychology, philosophy of 
childhood and children’s rights.   
I will discuss the potential significance in these areas relating to my own practice, experiences and 
learning and how this shift extends to a broader arena, namely: 
7.9.2 The potential implications for teachers who become Learning Support 
Specialists or educational psychologists 
 
Throughout my own learning during this Masters Course I considered my own training as a learning 
support specialist.  I critiqued my own stance in relation to the dominant theories of developmental 
psychology and how these theories influenced my practice as a learning support specialist.  On a 
broader level, this new learning about my own practice has opened up questions as to how tertiary 
institutions develop courses to train educators to become Learning Support Specialists and educational 
psychologists. I believe that my research is significant in terms of demonstrating the potentials of new 
forms of practice, as well as new forms of theory that Learning Support Specialists, educators, 
educational psychologists and academics teaching courses may open up potential opportunities to 
develop new insights and practices.  
Coursework and observations of child are still largely being taught through a lens that is dominated by 
a deficit model that underrates and undervalues the potential and capabilities of child.  In many 
instances, in reading through specific manuals and from my own experience of lecturing pre-service 
educators, there is still a strong slant towards dominant ideas that conceptualise child as the object in 
need of fixing and the psychologist or Learning Support Specialist as the expert who has all the answers 
in order to fix the problem. 
In viewing child through a different lens,  I have attempted to argue that a redesign and 
reconceptualization of child and childhood is crucial to course design at institutions that still hold on to 
hegemonic discourses, without taking into account the changing roles of child in society and the 
diverse capacities of children.  There is an urgent need to challenge these conventional discourses that 
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are rooted in the values of dominance and control.  Through these conventional discourses, child has 
been devalued and prevented from participating in the process of learning and knowledge creation. 
7.9.4 The potential implications for educators-in-training 
 
This research has significance for educators-in-training, specifically on the grounds of teaching for 
social justice.  It is through social justice that contributions can be made to stop the marginalisation of 
child who is disadvantaged by school contexts.  I suggest that educators-in-training need to be exposed 
to examining their own practices by examining their own assumptions as to how they conceptualise 
child and how these assumptions may influence, as Stables (2008) suggests, the way in which we deal 
with child.  The term ‘marginalised’ raises issues around empowerment and questions who the valid 
knowers are within educational contexts.  If the valid knower is always the adult (educator) then 
policies and practices will continue to be shaped by adult domination of ideas of what is best for child. 
I have touched on the importance of acknowledging child’s voice within an education system that 
often disadvantages child.  My emphasis on providing opportunities for child’s voice to be included and 
valued lies in the potential of significant pedagogies, such as the P4C program that encourages an 
expression of child’s voice through dialogue and reflection. Programmes such as P4C/PwC, encourage 
research projects, with children.  One such project28, undertaken by  Kiki Messiou of Hull University, in 
schools in Hull, working with educators and children suggests, that by allowing child’s voice to be 
included, educators have been urged to think of different approaches as to how they practise and 
more importantly, this research has highlighted how child’s contribution may suggest new ways of 
implementing pedagogy. 
In sum, it is pertinent to refer back to Kennedy and Kohan’s (2008) views which suggest that as adults, 
we need to prepare ourselves to listen to a different voice.  Both philosophers argue that in order to 
listen to a voice that has been historically silenced because of adult domination and by refusing to 
                                                          
28
 This three year project (2011-2014) is entitled “Investigating diversity in the classroom”.  It involves secondary schools in 
Lisbon, Madrid, Manchester and Hull. The project aims to develop new strategies for helping teachers make their lessons 
more inclusive by acknowledging children’s voices. www2.hull.ac.uk/diversity-project. 
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acknowledge child as a person, new ways as to how adults prepare to listen to child’s voice need 
urgent attention.  Kohan argues that adults need to “listen to different forms of reason, a different 
theory of knowledge, different ethics and different politics” (Kohan, 1999, p.7).  In moving towards 
analysing these differences and critically deconstructing dominant pedagogies and views of child that 
have centred around policies and practices in school contexts for decades, perhaps adult can move 
from the familiar into the unfamiliar by reconceptualising child.   It is hoped that this will ultimately 
bridge the gap between education and child.  
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